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Abstract   
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 investigates the impact of 
quantitative easing (QE) on the UK housing market and macroeconomic variables 
employing FAVAR, using monthly data from 2009M03 to 2016M12. The policy 
instrument in this study is the size of government assets purchased relative to 
2009Q1 GDP. The results suggest that QE supports economic recovery, contributes 
to GDP increase, and reduces unemployment, but significantly impacts house prices 
in the UK, particularly in England, and increases the house price to income ratio. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether a “feedback effect” exists in UK bond and equity 
markets whereby increasing investment flows leads to an increase in price, leading 
to further increases in investment. We found no evidence of this in the UK bond 
market. However, when including monetary policy shock, we find some evidence 
of a reinforcing price-flow dynamic in the bond market. We extend the analysis to 
include the open economy and look at the impact of monetary policy shock. We 
find in particular that tightening monetary policy causes outflow from domestic 
bonds (corporate) while the impact on foreign bond flows is uncertain. Furthermore, 
we examine whether investors choose bonds or equity due to monetary policy 
tightening. The result suggests a switch from equity to bonds. 
Chapter 3 analyses the impact of external demand, supply and oil price shocks on 
the UK economy using a rich dataset employing factor-augmented vector auto 
regression (FAVAR). Unlike previous studies, we distinguish shocks originating 
from emerging markets and advanced economies. The identification that has been 
used is based on sign restriction. The main result suggests that a positive demand 
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shock in advanced economies increases inflation, GDP deflator and wages. The 
profile for emerging markets is the same, but with lower magnitude. A positive 
supply shock to both regions reduces the prices in the UK. Finally, the oil price 
shock pushes up inflation both in the UK and internationally. The result from this 
FAVAR is comparable to multi country large scale models such as NiGEM. 
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Introduction to thesis  
 
This thesis applies recent advances in multiple time series analysis to model the 
dynamics of the UK economy using large panel data sets. This thesis has three 
chapters.  The first chapter uses a Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR), based on 
Bernanke et al. (2005), to assess the impact of unconventional monetary policy on 
a large array of UK macroeconomic variables including house price data. The 
second chapter applies the more conventional VAR approach to a wide range of 
asset classes to explore whether there is a feedback effect and herding in response 
to UK monetary policy shocks. The third chapter also uses a FAVAR to analyse the 
effect of various international shocks from advanced and emerging markets on a 
large panel of UK macroeconomic variables. By using large datasets in the 
statistical analysis, the thesis broadens the picture of the dynamics of the UK 
economy more than the existing literature.  
 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature. Significant contributions 
are discussed here, and there is more detail in each chapter. 
 
In the first chapter, I look at the impact of UK monetary policy on house prices 
post-crisis. When interest rates approached their effective lower bound during the 
financial crisis, central banks including the Bank of England (BoE) used a new set 
of monetary policy tools. Under quantitative easing (QE) central banks purchased 
assets on a large scale to reduce long-term yields. A key question is whether this 
had an impact on house prices and the economy, and if so, can we quantify it? House 
prices have been widely considered, by both academics and policy makers, to have 
contributed to the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The rebound in the housing market 
coincided with the introduction of QE in the first quarter of 2009 and with 
15 
 
subsequent programmes such as QE2 in late 2011 and QE3 in mid-2012 in the UK. 
This rebound and rapid increase in house prices sparked a debate about the role of 
QE and whether it had created a new bubble in the housing market, threatening 
future financial stability.  Most of the existing literature (e.g Weale and Wieladek 
(2016)) typically uses a simple VAR approach to study QE: this study will 
incorporate a large panel data set and employs Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR).  
Following Bernanke et al (2005) the framework divides information in two sets — 
observable and non-observable. The observable set contains output, inflation and 
the QE measure as a share of asset purchases in the first quarter of 2009 GDP as 
our policy instrument. We include the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) to 
capture the international dimension of our open economy. The unobservable set 
contains information that may not be captured by the observable set. This additional 
information is summarised in another three variables, the factors, which can 
describe and represent the characteristics of a large data set. The combination of 
both observable and non-observable information can describe the dynamics of the 
economy and answer our questions.  
 
The results suggest that QE supports economic recovery, contributes to GDP 
growth and reduces the unemployment rate. However it significantly impacts real 
house prices in the UK, particularly in England, and increases the house price to 
income ratio while reducing the user cost of housing by lowering mortgage rates. It 
does reduce uncertainty in financial markets, which creates a favourable 
environment for raising capital for Non-Financial Corporations, increases equity 
prices and reduces government and corporate bond yields. 
 
As we can see, despite the positive contribution of QE in terms of supporting 
economic recovery and boosting output and jobs, it may also contribute to debate 
on housing affordability and the difficulties faced by people trying to get into the 
housing market. In addition, the house price index is a leading indicator of the status 
of the economy and inflation increasing beyond the economic fundamentals and so 
may also pose a risk to financial stability and the economy. Martin Wolf, associate 
16 
 
editor and chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, London on the 
UK’s housing crisis, 5 February 20151 commented as ‘This is a really big issue. 
That is, of course, why no politician dares touch it.’ 
 
In the second chapter we analyse the asset management sector. Worldwide, fund 
managers managed $76tn in 2015.2 The UK is the second largest market for asset 
management after the US and it is relatively unregulated compared to the banking 
sector. The biggest company manages about the same volume of assets as the 
biggest banks, and asset management is an important player in financial sector. 
Recently, there has been a structural shift in the financial system, moving risk from 
banks to asset management. Since the crisis, policy makers have been concerned 
that the asset management sector may contribute to financial instability by 
redeeming from funds when markets decline, with implications for the real 
economy. An IMF report in 2013 examined the idea that the rising long term 
treasury yield could trigger herding (redemption, portfolio sales, and further rate 
increases which leads to falling bond prices). Feroli et al. (2014) provided a 
theoretical framework and suggested that they found evidence of feedback from 
bond flows to bond returns in the US. This paper follows Feroli et al. (2014) and 
applies the methodology to the UK data, using similar data with a broader set of 
asset classes. We contribute to the literature by expanding the analysis to the open 
economy and looking at whether investors will invest in the domestic economy or 
overseas as a result of domestic monetary policy shock. We also looked at how 
investors switch between bonds and equities.  
 
We find that in contrast to their analysis of the US economy, there is no evidence 
of a feedback effect in the UK bond market. However, when a monetary policy 
shock was included, we found some evidence of a reinforcing price-flow dynamic 
in the bond market. We find in particular that when monetary policy is tightened, 
investors redeem funds due to a rise in interest rates because of the fall in prices so 
                                                          
1 https://www.ft.com/content/f5b26d8a-ac59-11e4-9d32-00144feab7de 
2 The size of the nominal GDP for the world is around $74 trillion according the World Bank estimate for 2015. 
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there is an outflow from domestic corporate bonds. The impact on foreign bond 
flows is uncertain. We look at whether investors choose bonds or equity when 
monetary policy is tightened: the results suggest that investors switch from equity 
to bonds.  This chapter contributes to policy debates on the risk that financial 
instability in the asset management sector could spread to the real sector. For 
example, on 6 Feb 2018 market participants anticipated an interest rate rise and 
shifted their assets from equities to bonds and other assets. This wiped about US$4 
trillion from global markets within a week (Reuters 6 Feb 2018).3 This is in line 
with one of the predictions of the extension of the model, which is that investors 
may switch from equities to bonds when interest rates increase.  
 
In the third chapter we use another rich dataset to study the impact of external 
supply and demand shocks in the UK economy, distinguishing between shocks 
originating from emerging markets and advanced economies. This is important 
because the UK is leaving the EU, which may more imply trade with less advanced 
economies.  We employ a factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) similar to that in 
chapter one, which was expanded by Mumtaz and Surico (2009) to include 
international factors. The identification is based on sign restriction. The main result 
suggests that a positive demand shock in advanced economies increases inflation, 
GDP deflator and wages. This is in line with the literature. The profile for emerging 
markets is the same as for advanced economies but with lower magnitude. This can 
be explained by degree of interaction and economic ties with these countries. The 
response of prices to the demand shocks after 1997 is short lived, around 2-4 
quarters. This could be due to low inflation as a result of inflation targeting. 
However, the initial responses are comparable to the full sample. The oil price 
shock pushes inflation both in the UK and internationally. This will lead to 
decreases in consumption, GDP and house prices. The result from this VAR is 
comparable to the multi country large scale models NiGEM. This chapter 
contributes to policy debates on Brexit. 
                                                          
3 https://uk.reuters.com/article/global-markets/global-markets-rolling-world-stock-sell-off-runs-to-4-trillion-
idUKL8N1PW3MR 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
Chapter 1 
The Impact of Unconventional 
Monetary Policy on the UK 
Housing Market 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
When interest rates approached their effective lower bound during the financial 
crisis, central banks including the Bank of England (BoE) used a new set of 
monetary policy tools. Under quantitative easing (QE)4 central banks purchased 
assets on a large scale to reduce long-term yields by purchasing bonds.  
The impact of this policy on real GDP and inflation has been widely debated in 
academic and policy circles, for example by  Kapetanios et al. (2012), Joyce et al. 
(2011), Bridges and Thomas (2012), Churm et al. (2015), Weale and Wieladek 
(2016) and Cloyne et al. (2015) and Pesaran and Smith (2016).  
Previous studies relied on only a few variables to study the impact of QE:  this paper 
uses 139 variables related to real activity, prices, the financial market and the 
housing market to study the impact of QE on the UK economy, and in particular on 
the housing market. 
Following Bernanke et al. (2005) and Mumtaz and Surico (2009), we used  factor-
augmented vector autogression (FAVAR) to summarise information from 139 
variables from 2009M3 to 2016M12 into a small number of estimated factors and 
used them as regressors with GDP, CPI and QE measures to assess the impact of 
BoE-implemented QE in the UK. Employing a wider array of variables overcomes 
the problem of omitted information in a small-scale vector autoregression (VAR) 
model. It also allows us to look at the impact of the shock on individual variables 
in the panel.  
                                                          
4 “Creation of new money by central banks such as the Bank of England in order to buy assets in 
large quantities. In this the Bank will buy assets from the private sector, for example pension funds, 
high street banks and non-financial firms. The majority of these assets are government bonds (also 
known as gilts). As the market for government bonds is large the Bank can buy these assets in large 
quantities fairly quickly. The purchases of assets on such a scale will lead to pushing up the price 
and lowering yields (the returns) on them.  This will encourage the seller of the assets to use the 
money they received from the sale to buy assets with higher yield instead, such as company shares 
and bonds. As demand for this type of assets increases the yields in general will be lower. The 
company that issues these bonds will benefit from paying lower yields, thus having extra cash to 
invest and spend. This will boost the economy. ( adapted from Bank of England website)” 
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Figure 1-1 shows that the rebound in the housing market coincided with the 
introduction of QE in the first quarter of 2009 and with subsequent programmes 
such as QE2 in late 2011 and QE3 in mid-2012. This rebound and rapidly rising 
house prices sparked a debate about the role of QE in increasing house prices in the 
UK and in effectively creating a new bubble in the housing market. The house price 
index also serves as a leading indicator of the status of the economy and inflation, 
as pointed out by Stock and Watson (2003). It is one of the biggest domestic risks 
to financial stability, as BoE Governor Mark Carney suggested in his 2014 speech. 
House prices in London were even cited as a typical credit bubble by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2014.  
 
Figure 1-1: Annual house price rates of change, UK all dwellings from 
January 2006 to June 2017 along the QE as share of 2009q1 GDP 
Sources: ONS, BOE and author calculation 
House prices have been widely debated in both academic and policy circles as a 
contributor to the financial crisis in 2008-2009, which started in the US. Tylor 
(2009a, 2009b), Jarocinski and Smets (2008), and Ahrend (2010) pointed to the role 
of monetary policy, particularly very low interest rates over an unnecessarily long 
period, as creating housing market bubbles. In contrast, Bernanke (2010), Negro 
and Ottrok (2007), Greenspan (2009), and Dokko et al. (2009) argued that the global 
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savings surplus and unrestricted international capital flows were responsible for the 
housing bubbles in the US.  
We can get insight into house price increases, particularly in the UK, by examining 
the role of QE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses FAVAR 
to look into the impact of QE on the wider economy and in particular on UK house 
prices. 
Monetary policy can influence house prices directly and indirectly. The direct effect 
of monetary policy on house prices includes the transmission of the burden of cost 
to home owners, the expectation of future house price movement, and greater 
investment in housing supply, while the indirect effects appear in wealth and credit 
channels (Maclennan et al. 2000; Mishkin, 2007; Elbourne, 2007; Wadud et al., 
2012). 
The direct effect of monetary policy on user cost influences house prices because 
mortgage payments go down when interest rates go down. This reduces the user 
cost of housing, increases the demand for housing and pushes house prices up. The 
rate decrease also reduces construction costs, firms invest more and supply 
increases, which reduces prices.    
The indirect effect of monetary policy transmission is through wealth and credit 
channels. The fall in interest rates increases housing demand, house prices increase 
and home owners feel wealthier. This could encourage greater demand for housing 
and further price increases. It reduces the mortgage repayment for credit-
constrained households putting upward pressure on house prices.  
Unconventional monetary policy can affect the economy and, in particular, house 
prices by reducing bond yields. The mortgage rate goes down, reducing housing 
costs and increasing demand for houses, pushing house prices up and increasing 
expenditure through the wealth effect.  
In this paper, we analyse the impact of QE on the UK housing market and 
macroeconomic variables using factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR). 
We quantify the impact of QE on the housing market nationally and across regions 
in the UK, and on macroeconomic variables using a data-rich methodology. 
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1.2 Methodology 
 
This paper uses the framework from Bernanke et al. (2005). Let Yt be M by 1 vector 
of observable economic variables that drive the economy. In our case, this is QE 
and real activity and prices. We know some important information may not be 
captured by Yt and we summarise this additional information by K by 1 vectors of 
unobserved factors. 𝐹𝑡 = [𝐹1 𝐹2  𝐹3]‘, where K is small. The joint dynamic of Ft 
and Yt will be determined by the following equation: 
 
[
𝐹𝑡
𝑌𝑡
] = 𝐵(𝐿) [
𝐹𝑡−1
𝑌𝑡−1
] + 𝑢𝑡         (1-1) 
In this equation B (L) there is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order p, and 
𝑢𝑡, the error term with mean zero and covariance Ω. 
Equation (1-1) is a standard VAR model in which Ft is an unobservable factor that 
is extracted from a large panel of N indicators (136 in our example), which contains 
information about the economy. We can map the vector of information variables to 
the unobservable factors and observable variables in the following forms:  
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + 𝜆
𝑦𝑌𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡         (1-2) 
In this equation (1-2), 𝜆𝑓 is N by K and 𝜆𝑦 is N by M are the matrices of factor 
loading for unobservable and observable factors. In addition, 𝑣𝑡 is the metrics of N 
by 1 vector, zero mean disturbances. 
Equations 1-1 and 1-2 form the FAVAR model presented by Bernanke et al. (2005). 
As we can see from this model, 𝑋𝑡 will be driven by the joint dynamic of 𝐹𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡. 
As Bernanke et al. (2005) suggested, there are two methods that can be used to 
estimate the factor model. The first method is two-step estimation using principal 
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components. The second method is one-step estimation, which uses Bayesian 
likelihood methods. 
The estimation is based on a two-step procedure. The factors are estimated by the 
principal components (Stock and Watson 2002, 2005), and then their dynamics are 
estimated. Principal component analysis is a mathematical tool that reduces a 
complex data set, possibly correlated, to a lower dimension that is uncorrelated, 
called principal components. Simply put, we try to construct a small data set that 
can describe and represent the characteristics of a large data set. We have used the 
two step approach because of simplicity of computation, after Bernanke et al. 
(2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2007), Soares (2011), Bagzibagli (2012), Uhlig and 
Amir-Ahmadi (2012) and many others.  
There are some differences. The two step principal component estimation allows 
for some cross-correlation in error terms in equation (1-2), which must vanish as 
the number of variables (N) goes to infinity. Secondly the two step provides a 
nonparametric way of uncovering the common space spanned by the factors of 𝑋𝑡, 
which we denote by  ?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡).   The likelihood-based method, on the other hand, 
is fully parametric. Therefore the methods have different biases and variances, 
depending on how well specified the model is.  Finally, in the literature the two step 
approach is considered easier to compute than the one step.   
Extracting factors using principal components is subject to the rotational 
indeterminacy problem.  We should use a normalisation process while extracting 
factors using principal components. Following Bernanke et al. (2005), we use 
𝐶′*C/=I.  Where  𝐶′ = [(C(𝐹1 , 𝑌1), … . C(𝐹𝑇 , 𝑌𝑇))].  This implies that ?̂? = √𝑇?̂?, 
where  ?̂?  are the K largest eigenvector of  𝑋′𝑋, sorted in descending order. 
We divide the data into slow moving variables, available on a monthly frequency, 
and fast moving variables, available daily. We placed the policy variables last to 
ensure that unobserved variables do not respond within a month to the policy 
variables.  In the two step procedure, the factors need to be rotated to reflect the fact 
that policy can affect fast moving variables immediately. We follow Bernanke et 
al. (2005) for the two step explanation:  
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The first step uncovers the common space spanned by the factor 𝑋𝑡. We denote this 
common space ?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡) . In the first step process 𝑌𝑡  is not assumed to be observed, 
then the first K principal components of the dataset  𝑋𝑡   are assumed to uncover 
the space spanned by the estimate factors ?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡). In other words, QE, which is a 
policy variable in our example, would be part of a linear combination of underlying 
?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡)  because QE (policy variable) is part of  𝑌𝑡   in all specifications. It would 
thus not be valid to simply estimate a VAR in ?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡) and   𝑌𝑡 and identify the 
policy shock recursively. Therefore, we should remove the contemporaneous 
relationship between common space  ?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡)   and QE. The strategy would be to 
estimate the following regression. 
 
?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡) = 𝑏𝑐∗?̂? ∗ 𝐹𝑡 + 𝑏𝑄𝐸𝑄𝐸𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
In this ?̂? ∗ 𝐹𝑡  will be the estimate of all common components except QE. In practice 
we can obtain the estimate for?̂? ∗ 𝐹𝑡, using principal components from a subset of 
slow moving variables, which by assumption are not affected contemporaneously 
by QE. Then we estimate  ?̂?𝑡 , as follow:  
?̂?𝑡 =?̂?(𝐹𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡) − 𝑏𝑄𝐸𝑄𝐸𝑡 
We can then estimate a VAR that includes ?̂?𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 identified recursively and the 
QE comes last in our benchmark main model  
Finally, we follow standard procedure in VAR analysis from Koop and Korobilis’ 
(2009) implementation of the code from Bernanke et al. (2005). The diffuse priors 
were chosen to obtain impulse responses, then the error band was derived from the 
posterior density of the impulse responses.  
We also use Gibbs sampling to approximate the posterior distribution in the models 
with the 25 000 Gibbs replications and 15000 burn in draw in the main model.  For 
the other models we will report if we change the number of the Gibbs sampling due 
to their computational intensive time.   
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1.3 Data 
 
We use the monthly data from 2009M1 to 2016M12. The data sets contain 
information about real activity, price movements, money supply, the financial 
market and the housing market. For real activity, we collected data on production, 
output and retail sales as a measure of consumption and employment data. Inflation 
is based on wages, consumer price indices and import prices. The money market 
includes lending to household and non-financial firms from M4 and high street 
banks’ lending to industry. The financial market, on the other hand, includes the 
exchange rate, interest rate and equity market. The housing market includes housing 
supply, house prices and residential rent on both national and regional levels and 
mortgage lending. Appendix A shows the full list of the variables. We should note 
that we applied a seasonal adjustment X12 to all non-seasonally adjusted data. We 
deflated the nominal house price and equity by the consumer price index to create 
real house price and real equity prices. We also transformed the data to log 
difference and level difference to make it stationary before using it in the model. 
The sources for this data are ONS, DataStream, Bloomberg, OECD, and the Bank 
of England. 
 
1.4 Estimation  
 
We measure QE following Weale and Wieladek (2016) and Haldane et al. (2016). 
They measured QE as the volume of assets purchased relative to 2009Q1 GDP. 
They then directly introduced the Bank of England’s assets purchase programme as 
a monetary policy measure into the structural vector autoregression (SVAR). 
Unlike Weale and Wieladek (2016) we are using the FAVAR model, in which GDP, 
CPI and QE are the only observable variables. We summarise the state of the 
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economy by three factors that are extracted from a large panel of variables. These 
three factors, along the observable variables, create equation 1.  We order the QE, 
which is the size of assets purchased relative to 2009Q1 GDP, last. This ensures 
that the latent factors, GDP and CPI, do not respond to QE shock within the month. 
We also split data into slow-moving and fast-moving variables. Most financial data 
is available on a daily basis and is fast-moving in our model. We treat monthly data 
as slow-moving variables and standardise our data to zero-mean and variance one, 
then apply principal component analysis to capture the common factor in the data 
set.  
 
1.4.1 Selection of number of factors 
 
The number of factors could be determined by prior knowledge, visual inspection 
of scree plot, information criteria and many other statistical measures. For example, 
Bai and Ng (2002) and Onatski (2010) used information criteria to select the right 
number of factors. Bernanke et al. (2005) used a range of models to determine the 
number of factors. To decide the number of factors to model the impact of monetary 
policy on the economy, they compared the impact of the shock on the economy 
using a different number of factors each time. Unfortunately there is not a widely 
accepted method for determining the number of factors. 
We compute the number of common factors using Bai and Ng’s (2002) information 
criteria presented in table 1-1. According to various criteria the most popular 
common factors could be three or five factors.  Our sample is just 94 observations 
and it would be difficult to include many factors due to the lack of degrees of 
freedom. We decided on three factors, and they are equally as important as five 
factors. We also visually inspect the number of factors using a scree plot, which is 
a graphical representation of eigenvalues ordered from largest to smallest. We can 
show this by the per cent of variance explained by each principal component in 
Figure 1-2. The horizontal axis shows the principal components and the vertical 
axis shows the amount of variance that can be explained by each principal 
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component. Based on this information we select three factors that can explain more 
than 70 per cent of the variation in our data. 
 
 IC criteria PC criteria  BIC3 
criteria 
  AIC3 
criteria 
nb factor  IC1 IC2 IC3 PC1 PC2 PC3 BIC3 AIC3 
0 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989* 
1 -0.107 -0.098 -0.131 0.879 0.885 0.865 0.857 0.938 
2 -0.130 -0.111 -0.178 0.847 0.859 0.818 0.803 0.963 
3 -0.150* -0.122* -0.222 0.823 0.841* 0.780 0.757 0.996 
4 -0.148 -0.110 -0.244 0.820* 0.843 0.762 0.731 1.049 
5 -0.145 -0.098 -0.265* 0.820 0.849 0.748* 0.709* 1.104 
 
Table 1-1: Selection of the number of factors based on information criteria 
The * indicates the common factors for these variables. 
 
Figure 1-2: The per cent of variance explained by each principal component 
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1.4.2 Contribution of each variable to each 
principal component (factor)  
 
The contribution of each variable for a given principal component is important 
because we can see how our house price data is represented in the factors that we 
have chosen. In PCA the correlation between factor and variable shows the 
information they share. This correlation coefficient is called factor loading, which 
we denote as 𝜆. We follow Abdi and Williams (2010) in that the sum squared 𝜆2 of 
the correlation between variable and factors should equal 1.  Therefore, the squared 
𝜆2 coefficient is easier to interpret, as it represents the proportion of variance of a 
variable that is explained by a factor. Figure 1-3 shows the contribution of each 
variable to the first three factors. As we can see, house prices are well represented 
in these three factors. For example, the contribution of UK house prices to the first 
three factors ranked first. Most house price variables such as those for England, 
London, and the Southeast and East ranked top when we order the variables 
according to their contribution to the three factors.  
 
Figure 1-3: The proportion of variance of a variable that is explained by 
three factors 
* Size of square reflects their contribution to the first three factors 
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1.5 Empirical Results 
 
This section describes the main results. First, we present the aggregate 
macroeconomic response to the shock and compare it with existing studies to 
establish a benchmark. Second, we discuss the housing market and associated 
sectors, such as house prices and financial and credit markets. Third we check for 
robustness: we estimate the model using sign restriction; we replace the QE 
measure by Weale and Wieladek (2016) with the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rate and 
recompute our main model, and we update the main model to include the 
international dimension of our small open economy. Finally, we present the forecast 
error of our main estimation.  
1.5.1 Aggregate macroeconomic response 
 
Figure 1-4 presents the impulse response on selected variables when asset purchases 
are increased by 1 per cent of GDP. The significant impact of QE on the overall 
macroeconomic variables is clear and the direction of the impact is in line with 
economic theory, as expected. GDP and industrial production has increased while 
unemployment has fallen. Increasing money supply may lead to pressure on 
Sterling, devaluing the exchange rate and boosting exports. It reduced volatility as 
a measure of uncertainty in the market, given that at the time the economy was in 
flux due to the financial crisis. The real asset price appreciated and consumer prices 
increased. Figure 1-4 shows that purchasing assets worth 1 per cent of GDP will 
increase real GDP up to 0.25 per cent over 3 years; the consumer price index will 
increase up to 0.032 per cent within 5 months and unemployment will fall by 40 
basis points over 3 years.  
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Figure 1-4: Aggregate macroeconomic response to assets purchases main 
model 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
We compare our estimation of the impact of QE to existing literature in table 2. 
Most of this literature looks at the broader impact of QE on the economy. In 
addition, there is a consensus in empirical literature that QE can stimulate economic 
activity. However, it is more difficult to estimate the impact of QE on economic 
activity than on financial markets.  
Kapetanios et al. (2012), use three different VAR models to construct 
counterfactual forecasts considering that QE reduced the yield spreads. Taking the 
average estimate from these models, they concluded that QE had a peak impact of 
1.5 per cent on real output and 1.25 percentage points on CPI. Bridges and Thomas 
(2012) use the money demand and supply framework to assess the impact of QE on 
money supply and spending and incorporate it into an SVAR model. Their estimates 
across the average model are very similar to Kapetanios et al. (2012), which is that 
real GDP increased by 2 per cent and CPI by 1 percentage point. 
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Churm et al. (2015) use ARDL and BVAR models to assess the impact of QE and 
found that QE1 has a peak impact of 0.8 per cent on GDP and 0.6 percentage points 
on CPI. They found that QE2 has a similar impact, 0.6 per cent, on GDP and a 
significant positive impact on inflation. 
Weale and Wieladek (2016) used SVAR with four-difference identification to 
assess the impact of QE in the US and the UK. They concluded that asset purchases 
of 1 per cent of GDP, can increase real GDP by up to 0.25 per cent and CPI by up 
to 0.32 per cent in the UK. Haldane et al. (2016) expanded their work to measure 
the impact of an increased central bank (CB) balance sheet on the economy. The 
results are broadly the same for the UK and the US, as they used the same 
methodology and data as Weale and Wieladek (2016).  
Most of these studies use a variety of models to assess the impact of the QE with 
very high uncertainty. They report their findings by taking the average of the 
estimated models.  
As table 2 shows, overall results are broadly in line with the current literature 
considering the high uncertainty around the estimations, difference models, 
different identification and inclusion of pre-crisis data. 
 
 
* BVAR, (within a year), MS-VAR (Within a month) and TVP-VAR (after 3 quarter). This is the average of the model 
response. 
Table 1-2: Our results in comparison to other studies 
  GDP (%) CPI (PP) Time Frame peak impact  
Joyce, Tong and Wood (2011) 1.5 0.75 NA 
Kapetanios, et al. (2012) 1.5 1.25 
 Using different model, hence different 
time * 
Bridges and Thomas (2012) 2 1 Output 2 year and inflation a year  
Pesaran and Smith (2016) 1 
 
On impact  and disappear within 2 
years 
Ghoodhart and Ashworth (2012) 3 0.4 NA 
Weale and Wieladek (2016) 3.1 4.3 NA ( from graph within a year) 
Churm  et al. (2015) 0.8 0.6 after a year  
Cloyne et al. (2015) 5.5 1.5  After around 6 years 
This paper  3.3 0.4 output  within 20 month, CPI within 5  
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1.5.2 Housing market  
 
In this section we look at the national and regional housing market and house prices 
in the UK. We also look at bank lending, in particular mortgage lending. The 
housing market, especially house prices, are affected by economic conditions, the 
availability and affordability of mortgages, population changes and housing supply. 
In addition, because houses are assets they are subject to speculation. The 
exceptionally low yield for government bonds sends investors looking for 
alternative assets. Jorda et al. (2014) suggest that loose monetary policy may lead 
to a boom in real estate and this in turn may affect financial stability.  
1.5.2.1 Housing market overview  
 
Figure 1-5 presents the impulse response to increases of asset purchases by 1 per 
cent of GDP on selected variables in the housing market. The horizontal axis shows 
the month and the vertical axis shows the impact of the shock. We can see that due 
to the QE shock real house prices increased 7 per cent over three years. This 
generated capital gains and boosted household wealth. An ONS survey suggested 
that aggregate household gross property wealth increased by £625 billion from July 
2008 to June 2014.  
The figure also shows house prices by country. The biggest house price increases 
occurred in England with a similar rate to the overall UK house price increase. 
There were no significant and immediate house price increases in Scotland, Wales 
or Northern Ireland, where prices rose by 1 to 3 per cent. The difference in response 
across countries suggests heterogeneity in the housing market in the UK. 
Furthermore, as home ownership increases short run rental prices decline in 
England and Wales. In the medium term the rental price in England will revert to 
base and there is a long-term impact on the rental price in Wales.  
The total sales volume of properties decreased, which may have put extra pressure 
on house prices due to lack of supply. The higher house prices combined with a 
supply shortage and lower wage growth increases the house price to income ratio. 
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This will reduce housing affordability, even though mortgage costs are lower.  
 
Figure 1-5: Overall housing market response to assets purchases main model 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
1.5.2.2 House prices in England  
 
Figure 1-6 presents the response of house prices to QE shock in England. Nearly 
all house prices in England are rising between 3 to 7 per cent cumulatively, with 
Yorkshire and the Humber showing the smallest gains. Surprisingly we do not see 
huge increases in London: the real house price in London increases by about 3 per 
cent. This does not support the view that house price increases in London are due 
to cheap credit. The IMF in 2014 report cited soaring house prices in London as a 
sign of a credit bubble, but house prices in London may be fuelled by other factors 
as well. In Figure 1-7 we illustrate the England housing stock as a share of the 
population between 2001 and 2015. We can see that housing stock as a share of the 
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population in London is falling much faster than in any other area in the UK. This 
is a trend that commenced in 2004, when the UK opened its doors to new European 
members. It shows that supply is a major issue in London, and the population is 
rising. The ratio of house prices are 10 times higher than average income in London, 
which is twice the UK average. Furthermore, the increase in house prices in London 
has a spillover effect to other parts of the UK (Holly et al., 2009). 
House prices in the South West, South East and East are rising much faster than 
elsewhere in England due to the shock. Real house prices in these regions increased 
between 5-7 per cent over the horizon. 
 
 
Figure 1-6: England Real House price response to assets purchases 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
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Figure 1-7: England region housing stock as a share of population between 
2001 and 2015 
Source: ONS, author calculation  
 
 
1.5.2.3 Financial and credit market. 
 
The first three rows in Figure 1-8 show the financial market response to the QE 
shock. The response is unsurprising. Volatility as a measure of uncertainty 
decreased due to QE, the FTSE improved, the exchange rate fell, the corporate bond 
rate fell about 60 basis points while the 10-year government bond rate fell to about 
70 basis points, and the mortgage interest rate also fell. 
Central bankers and others have suggested that QE has reduced the long-term yield 
by reducing term premiums. Yellen (2012), for example, said that research by 
Federal Reserve staff and others showed that their balance sheet operation had a 
substantial effect on the long-term Treasury bond. A lot of research suggested that 
QE had decreased the bond yield: this includes Wright (2012), D’Amico et al. 
(2013), Bauer and Rudebusch (2014), Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), Chung 
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et al. (2012), Gagnon et al. (2011), Hamilton and Wu (2012), Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Meyer and Bomfim (2010) and Neely (2015). 
In the UK, Breedon et al. (2012), Caglar et al. (2011), Bridges and Thomas (2012), 
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), Joyce et al. (2011a), Joyce and Tong (2012), 
Kapetanios et al. (2012), McLaren et al. (2014), and Meier (2009) reported that the 
first round of QE had reduced the bond yield between 48-150 basis points. Meier 
(2009) estimates that the first round of QE reduced the bond yields by 48-60 basis 
points, while Joyce et al. (2011) estimated that the first year of QE reduced 
government bond yields by about 100 basis points. Weale and Wieladek (2016) 
report that the 20 year government bond yields will reduce by 50 basis points as a 
result of QE.  
The fall in bond yields could induce a fall in other interest rate instruments such as 
the mortgage rate. In turn, the fall in the mortgage rate could reduce the cost of 
having a mortgage. This could be the one of the channels that influence house prices 
in the UK. 
Furthermore, equity prices have increased by about the same amount as house 
prices. Òscar Jordà et al.(2017) studied 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, 
covering total return for equity, housing, bonds, and bills. They concluded that 
housing returns are the same as equity with lower risk. Furthermore the returns on 
housing is higher than assets such as bond and treasury bills. This makes property 
an attractive investment during periods of high uncertainty since the financial crisis. 
The assets purchased through QE from the non-bank private sector were deposited 
in the banking sector. This increased the banking sector reserve with the Bank of 
England (BoE), increasing liquidity in the banking system and encouraging more 
lending. However, as the banking system was under pressure to reduce their balance 
sheets, there was little expectation by the Bank of England and MPC that the banks 
would increase lending (Joyce et al., 2011). 
The last two rows in Figure 1-8 show the state of the lending market in the UK 
when asset purchases were increased by 1 per cent of GDP. Overall credit 
conditions improved for both the household and non-financial sectors. For example, 
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we can see increases in lending to households and in firms' ability to raise capital 
through selling securities. M4 lending to non-financial corporations initially 
increased but the degree of uncertainty is increased over the horizon. However, M4 
lending to households that is secured by dwellings has improved. A speech by Alex 
Brazier (2017) from the Bank of England suggests that over the past 10 years, the 
number of consumer credit write offs is 10 times higher than mortgages and in 
addition, people in Britain do everything they can to pay off their mortgage debt. 
This is why banks did not take huge losses on mortgages during the crisis and shows 
why banks prefer secured lending. This in turn gives people who already own one 
property a better chance of buying another. This is in line with the IMF report 
(2016) that buy-to-let lending has grown faster than overall residential property 
lending. This may also increase the price of the property.  
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Figure 1-8: Financial and credit market response to assets purchases 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
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1.6 Robustness 
 
We look at the robustness of our result from several perspectives. We first use sign 
restriction to evaluate the robustness of our result.  Then we examine our result by 
replacing the QE measure with the shadow rate (Wu and Xia 2016). Finally we 
include additional variables to cover the international dimension of our model.  
1.6.2 Sign restriction  
 
Sign restriction is a popular tool for looking at the impact of a shock. The method 
was pioneered by Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Fatus (1998), Canova and del 
Nicole (2002) and Uhlig (2005). They suggested that structural inference using 
VAR might be based on prior beliefs about the sign of the impact of certain shocks 
(Baumeister and Hamilton, 2015).  
In this, we have the following prior assumptions on the observable variables while 
unobservable data will be unrestricted. To identify shocks in our model we extend 
the observable set and include long term interest rates and real equity price 
following Weale and Wieladek (2016). We identify the AP, or QE, shock as being 
the only shock which moves equity prices and long run interest rates in opposite 
directions and which also has a positive association between QE and equity prices 
to distinguish it from an (not modelled in this revision) uncertainty shock. 
Furthermore, as result of a shock to output the CPI will increase while a shock to 
CPI will reduce output. However, the impact for both shocks on assets purchases 
(AP) will be determined in the model.  In addition, as we are going to look at impact 
of the AP shock on CPI and GDP, we do not restrict the output and CPI. However, 
the impact on long term bond and real equity prices is positive in both cases.  Table 
1-3 present this identification scheme.  
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Column1 
Log 
GDP  
Log 
CPI       QE 
10 year Gov.      
B yield  
 log Real 
equity price 
Demand shock  + +  + + 
Supply shock - +  + + 
AP  shock    + - + 
Table 1-3: The matrix for restriction 
This table shows the sign restriction on the impulse response for each identified shock. + Sign 
shows positive, while - shows negative. Blank entry indicates no restriction. 
 
This scheme is implemented as follows. We can decompose the covariance matrix 
of Ω in the following form  
Ω = 𝐴0𝐴0
′  
In this 𝐴0 shows the contemporaneous impact of the structural shock𝜀𝑡. 𝐴0 can be 
restricted using prior information to define the shock of the interest. In practice we 
can get the structural matrix 𝐴0 through the procedures introduced by Rubio-
Ramírez et al. (2008).    We can decompose the structural covariance matrix  Σ   of 
VAR into eigenvalue –eigenvector as flow    Ω = 𝑃𝐷𝑃′  and we define  ?̃?0 = 𝑃𝐷
1
2  
. Then we draw N×N from the Normal distribution, N (0, 1) and take the QR 
decomposition of K. We compute Q and R such that K=QR, then we compute a 
structural impact matrix as 𝐴0 = ?̃?0𝑄
′. We will keep the shock if it satisfies the 
sign condition; otherwise we discard it. 
 
Figure 1-9 shows the responses of UK macroeconomic variables when asset 
purchases were increased by 1 per cent of GDP in 2009 using sign restriction. The 
output is scaled to the standard deviation of the shock. Comparing this figure to 
those obtained under recursive identification in Figure 1-4 shows that our results 
are robust. The general direction of the movement of the variables is identical to 
what we obtained earlier. However, the magnitude of response for some variables 
differs. For example, we can see that the response of long term government bonds 
is stronger under the sign restriction. As output increases, unemployment falls by 
nearly the same amount as in our main estimation while CPI is barely responsive, 
and ambiguous. The exchange rate will fall, leading to fewer imports and 
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encouraging more exports. Although the confidence band under sign restriction is 
much wider for the majority of our results, the median response is nearly the same.   
Because of the decline in government bond yields, investors may exchange UK 
assets for foreign ones in the search for higher returns. Therefore, QE will put 
downward pressure on the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). We can see 
from Figure 1-9 that the exchange rate is falling due to asset purchases. This will 
increase the competitiveness of the UK economy and exports will grow faster than 
imports, boosting output growth. 
  
 
Figure 1-9: Aggregate macroeconomic response to assets purchases sign 
restriction 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
sign restriction. The shock scale to standard deviation of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw 
and 15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
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The impact on the housing market and house prices in England is shown in Figures 
1-10 and 1-11. The results are very similar result to those in Figure 1-5 and 1-6, 
however, the median magnitude is slightly lower than the result obtained under 
recursive identification, while its confidence band is slightly wider. Overall house 
prices increased over the horizon by about 6 per cent. The real house price response 
in England is between 2 to 5 per cent. House sales initially increase but fall over 
time, consistent with the earlier result. 
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Figure 1-10: Overall housing market response to assets purchases sign 
restriction 
 
Figure 1-11: England Real House price response to assets purchases sign 
rustication 
The figures 1-10 and 1-11 show the median response together with 68% confidence band. We show 
results for sign restriction. The shock scale to standard deviation of QE shock and 25000 Gibbs 
replication and 10000 for inference were used to grenade impulse response.  
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Figure 1-12: Financial and credit market response to assets purchases under 
sign restriction  
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
sign restriction. The shock scale to standard deviation of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw 
and 15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
 
Figure 1-12 shows the impact on financial and credit markets under sign restriction. 
Comparing this result to those obtained under recursive identification, we can see 
nearly an identical response except net lending mortgages. Volatility as a measure 
of uncertainty in financial markets is reduced by 3 per cent. Most interest rates are 
falling as expected. 
In summary, under sign restriction the median impact is nearly the same with the 
highlighted exceptions. We can have a wider confidence band than our base model, 
under sign restriction. Overall, our result is robust. 
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1.6.2 Shadow rate  
 
The shadow rate was introduced by Fischer Black (1995) and extended by Wu and 
Xia (2016), to measure the impact of QE on the base rate in the US. It shows the 
impact of QE on the traditional bank base rate, which can be negative. In other 
words, the shadow rate computes the base rate equivalent of QE using Treasury 
forward rates. As described by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, “These forward 
rates are constructed with end-of-month Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield curve 
parameters from the Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) dataset. […]. In short, 
the shadow rate is assumed to be a linear function of three latent variables called 
factors, which follow a VAR (1) process. The latent factors and the shadow rate are 
estimated with the extended Kalman filter.” (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
2017). The full description of the model can be found in Wu and Xia (2016).  
The shadow rate can be a substitute for the base rate in economic models such as 
VAR, the New Keynesian model and the general equilibrium model (Dee Gil, 
2017). Figure 1-13 compares the shadow rate to the official Bank of England rate. 
We can see the shadow rate tracking the base rate closely. We estimate our main 
FAVAR model by replacing the QE measure (Weale and Wieladek (2016)) with 
the shadow rate (Wu and Xia 2016). As the shadow rate is a substitute for the base 
rate, we reduce the base rate by 100 basis points.  
Figure 1-14 presents the impact of a reduction of 100 basis points over the same set 
of variables in Figure 1-4. Comparing these figures to our main model estimation 
in Figure 1-4 shows that they are virtually identical except that we see a fall in real 
output and an increase in unemployment before the model settles. Overall, most of 
the variables produce nearly the same result. However, we can see a stronger 
response from the CPI, which stays positive to the end of the horizon and increases 
by 0.12 per cent.  
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Figure 1-13: Shadow rate and Bank of England base rate 
 
 
Figure 1-14: Aggregate macroeconomic response to assets purchases shadow 
rate 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
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Figure 1-15: Overall housing market response to assets purchases shadow 
rate. 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
Figure 1-15 shows the overall house price equivalent to Figure 1-5 in our main 
result. All the responses are similar with minor changes to their magnitude, except 
house sales. House sales under the shadow rate are increasing rather than 
decreasing. Furthermore the regional house price in Figure 1-16 is comparable to 
Figure 1-6 in our main result. Overall, we can see a positive influence on real house 
prices, just as we obtained in our main result. However, the magnitude for the 
median response is falling compared to our benchmark result.  We can see that the 
median response for the South West and South East declines to around 2 and 4 per 
cent over the horizon. However, the response of house prices in London increases 
to around 4 per cent. In addition, under the shadow rate we have a brief very small 
negative for most house prices at the beginning. This could be due to the strong CPI 
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response at the beginning of the model. As the CPI increases real house prices fall. 
The financial market response is also similar to the one we obtained in our main 
model. 
 
Figure 1-16: England Real House price response to assets purchases shadow 
rate. 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
 
49 
 
 
 
Figure 1-17: Financial market response to assets purchases under shadow 
rate 
This figure shows the median response and the 68 per cent confidence band. We show results for 
recursive identification. The shock scale to unit of QE shock, 25000 Gibbs replication draw and 
15000 burn in draw were used to generate impulse response.  
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1.6.3 Open economy  
 
The simplest approach without changing the structure of the model is to introduce 
an extra observable variable to the VAR to capture the international development 
in our model.  The extra variables, one by one as part of the observable variable, 
place last in the VAR, this is the approach followed by Weale and Wieladek (2016).  
The approach of adding extra external variables to the VAR is also used by Bruno 
and Shin (2015) to cover the international dimension of their model.  We added the 
spread between Italian and German 10-year government bond yields, the natural 
logarithm of real oil price in the UK sterling, the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) and finally we take the common factor of asset purchase as a share of GDP 
in 2009Q1 by ECB, Federal Reserve (Fed) and Bank of Japan. 
The result from the inclusion of these additional external variables on the broad 
macroeconomic variables, housing market, house prices in England and the 
financial and lending market are in Appendix B. The overall result is in Figure 1-
18 below.  The results appear robust and are broadly intuitive: asset purchases by 
the Bank of England increase GDP, reduce unemployment, increase house prices 
and increase house to income ratio. This occurred in every scenario we tested.  
Furthermore, the scenarios also increase equity prices, reducing the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) and bond yields, although the impact on these 
variables under these scenarios differs in magnitude but within a reasonable band. 
Details are in Appendix B.  Overall our result is robust to the inclusion of an 
international development variable.  
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Figure 1-18: Results with NEER as Control Variable (overview open 
economy) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is included as a control 
variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 
as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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1.6.3 Variance decomposition (FEVD) 
 
We look at determining the fraction of forecasting error that is attributable to a QE 
shock for common components. This is an important exercise that shows how much 
of the forecast error is due to the given shock at a particular horizon. To implement 
this, we follow the steps set out in Bernanke et al (2004). In this, the variance 
decomposition for 𝜒𝑖𝑡 can be expressed as the following equation: 
Λ𝑖 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑡+𝑘 − ?̌?𝑡+𝑘|𝑡|𝜖𝑡
𝐴𝑃
)Λ𝑖
′
Λ𝑖 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑡+𝑘−?̌?𝑡+𝑘|𝑡)Λ𝑖
′          (1-3) 
 
In this equation Λ𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎline of Λ = [Λ𝑓 , Λ𝑞] and the following part 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑡+𝑘 − ?̌?𝑡+𝑘|𝑡|𝜖𝑡
𝐴𝑃
)
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝑡+𝑘−?̌?𝑡+𝑘|𝑡)
       (1-4) 
is the standard VAR variance decomposition for equation 1-1. 
 
Table 1-4 reports the results for forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD), 
measuring what percentage of the variance of 5, 15, 20 and 36 months ahead the 
forecast error owes to the QE shocks. The last column shows the R2 of the common 
components for each of these variables. The contribution of the QE shock ranges 
between 5.8 to 11.6 per cent at the horizon of 36 months, with the exception of the 
financial market variables. This may suggest a relatively small impact for the 
monetary policy shock. However, inspecting R2 of the common components, the 
result suggests that most of the house prices are well represented in our factors. This 
is also evident from Figure 1-3 which we looked at before our analysis. For 
example, the house price has R2 of 89 per cent. This confirms that the estimated 
FAVAR captures an important dimension of the UK business cycle. In addition, we 
should have less confidence in those variables with low R2 (Bernanke et al. 2005).  
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Horizon (in Month) 5 15 20 36 R2 
QE 68.5 46.1 40.4 32.5 100* 
FTSE  34 32.4 31.2 27.4 6.9 
Corporate (BBB) 29.5 19.9 17.9 15.4 92.3 
Government 10 year  28 22.6 20.6 17.9 77.4 
Ind. P 27.1 26.4 24.4 19.2 1.9 
VOLATILITY 30 Day 26.4 27.7 27.4 25.2 3 
Net finance raised by PNFCS 10.3 11.1 11.3 11.3 22.7 
Exports Goods & Services 8.8 10.5 10.7 11.6 14.2 
Effective exchange rate index 7.5 9.6 10.2 11.2 5.6 
Import  Goods & Services 7.5 9.4 9.6 10.9 4.4 
M4 lending non-financial  corporations 
securities 5.1 7.1 7.5 8.5 9.3 
M4 lending  Secured on dwellings 4.3 5.6 5.9 6.6 12.5 
M4 lending  Total household sector 3.7 7.1 7.9 8.9 74.3 
Unemployment 2.7 5.8 6.8 8.3 96.4 
M4 lending Total NFCRP 2.7 3 3.7 5.6 98.9 
      
House Price       
North East HP 4.1 6.3 6.7 7.5 19.2 
Wales  HP 3.5 5.7 6.2 7.4 14.9 
East Midlands HP 3.2 5.4 5.8 6.6 46.4 
South West HP 2.9 5.2 5.8 6.6 42 
Scotland HP 2.7 4.2 4.6 5.5 22.9 
East HP 2.4 4.3 4.7 5.7 54.8 
South East HP 2.4 4.3 4.8 5.6 64.5 
North West HP 2.4 3.9 4.3 5.1 39.4 
London HP 2.1 3.9 4.2 4.7 50.9 
Northern Ireland HP 2 3.7 4.3 5.2 50 
England HP 2 3.9 4.2 5.1 82 
West Midlands HP 2 3.7 4.2 4.8 39.7 
Yorkshire and The Humber HP 2 3.7 4.1 5 37.3 
UK HP 1.9 3.7 4 4.8 89.4 
Table 1-4: Contribution of the QE shock to variance of the common 
components. 
*Shows observable by construction, the table show the median for FEVD 
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1.7 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examined the dynamic effect of quantitative easing (QE) on the 
UK housing market and wider economy from 2009M3 to 2016M12 using monthly 
data fed into factor-augmented vector auto regression (FAVAR).  
The results suggest that QE supports economic recovery, contributes to GDP 
growth and reduces unemployment. It has a significant impact on house prices in 
the UK, particularly in England. Surprisingly, the result does not support the claim 
that London house prices are due to cheap credit: supply may also be a constraint 
in London. The transmission mechanism could be attributed to both direct and 
indirect effects of unconventional monetary policy. The direct effects reduce 
mortgage rates, which lead to a reduction in housing costs in line with Gabriel et al. 
(2014), while indirect effects could be through the wealth effect experienced by 
homeowners. QE increases the house price to income ratio, but depresses rent prices 
in the short term. The impact of macroeconomic variables is in line with the current 
literature and the expected financial market reaction.  
Our estimates of the impact of asset purchase on output and CPI are similar to 
earlier work on the impact of monetary policy in the UK, despite using different 
models and identification, and the inclusion of pre-crisis data in previous estimates. 
We do not have a benchmark to assess our house price impact but we have tested 
our results using sign restriction, the shadow rate of Wu and \ Xia (2016) and an 
open economy model.  
QE is shown to support economic recovery and boost output and jobs, but it may 
adversely affect housing affordability, especially for first home buyers. The house 
price index is a leading indicator of the status of the economy and inflation 
increasing beyond the fundamental may pose a risk to financial stability and the 
economy.  
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APPENDIX A : list of variables in the model , transcode, 5 log difference, 2 level 
difference, 1 level, 3 second  level difference ; Slow=0, fast =1. 
 
Variable Transcode slow/fast Name  
1 5 0 Ind. P 
2 5 0 Mining & Qur. 
3 5 0 Manuf. 
4 5 0 Elec., Gas steam and air con. 
5 5 0 Water Supply, Swe. & w.  Management 
6 5 0 Construction 
7 5 0  Services 
8 5 0  Distr. & Accom. & Food Service  
9 5 0 Transp. And Storage & Information and Comm. 
10 5 0 Fin., Real est., Scient., Prof., Tech and Support act 
11 5 0 PAD, Educ., Health, Soc. Work, Arts, Ent and Rec. 
12 5 0  Consumer Durables 
13 5 0  Consumer Non-Durables 
14 5 0  Capital Goods 
15 5 0  Intermediate Goods 
16 5 0  Energy 
17 5 0  All Retailers inc. Fuel(Vol.) 
18 5 0  All Retailers ex. Fuel(Vol.) 
19 5 0 Predominantly food stores 
20 5 0 Total 
21 5 0 Household goods stores 
22 5 0 Predominantly automotive fuel1 
23 5 0  All Retailers inc. Fuel(Val.) 
24 5 0  All Retailers ex. Fuel(Val.) 
25 5 0 Predominantly food stores 
26 5 0 Total 
27 5 0 Household goods stores 
28 5 0 Predominantly automotive fuel1 
29 3 0 Pop. Aged 16 and over 
30 5 0 Total in employment 
31 1 0 Economic activity 
32 1 0 Unemployment 
33 5 0 Import  Goods & Services 
34 5 0 Exports Goods & Services 
35 5 0 PS. Net debt (PSND)  £m CPNSA 
36 1 0 PS. Net Debt (ex. PS. Banks) as a % of GDP 
37 1 0 PS.net inv., ex. PS. Banks (£ million) 
38 5 0 RPI  
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39 5 0 RPIX Excl. Mortgage Interest  
40 5 0 Food and non-alcoholic beverages 
41 5 0 Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 
42 5 0 Clothing and footwear 
43 5 0 Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
44 5 0 Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 
45 5 0 Health 
46 5 0 Transport 
47 5 0 Communication 
48 5 0 Recreation & culture 
49 5 0 Education 
50 5 0 Restaurants and hotels 
51 5 0 Miscellaneous goods and services 
52 5 0 Whole Economy wage 
53 5 0 Man., wage  
54 5 0 Construction wage  
55 5 0 Services, wage  
56 5 0 Wholesaling, retailing, hotels & restaurants,  wage  
57 5 0 Private sector Wage  
58 5 0 Public sector Wage  
59 5 0 Fin. & and bus. Services, wage 
60 5 0 PS ex.  Fin.  Services  wage  
61 5 0 Import index  
62 5 0 Export index  
63 5 0 M4 
64 5 0 M0 
65 1 0 Financial corporations 
66 1 0 M4 lending non-financial  corporations loan 
67 5 0 M4 lending non-financial  corporations securities 
68 1 0 M4 lending Total NFCRP 
69 1 0 M4 lending  Total Consumer credit 
70 1 0 M4 lending  Unincorporated  
71 1 0 M4 lending  Total household sector 
72 1 0 M4 lending  Secured on dwellings 
73 5 0 Mining & Qur. ( lending) 
74 1 0 Man.(lending) 
75 1 0 Construction& real estate(lending) 
76 5 0 Electricity & etc(lending) 
77 5 0 Wholesale ( lending) 
78 5 0 Transport, storage (lending) 
79 1 0 Total (lending) 
80 3 0 Net Lending Mortgage 
81 5 0 Total approvals for house purchase(Val.) 
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82 5 0 Total approvals for remortgaging (Val.) 
83 5 0 Total approvals for other secured (Val. 
84 5 0 Total approvals for secured lending(Num.) 
85 5 0 Total approvals for house purchase(Num.) 
86 5 0 Total approvals for remortgaging(Num.) 
87 1 0 Total  approvals for other secured(Num.) 
88 1 0 Net finance raised by PNFCS 
89 1 0 Equity issued PNFCS 
90 1 0 Bonds issued PNFCS 
91 1 0 Commercial paper issued PNFCS 
92 1 0 Loans by MFIS 
93 5 0 Average value (HP) 
94 5 0 House sale Total 
95 5 0 New build Sale 
96 3 0 England Rent 
97 5 0 Wales Rent 
98 5 0 North East Rent 
99 5 0 North West Rent 
100 5 0 Yorkshire and The Humber Rent 
101 5 0 East Midlands Rent 
102 5 0 West Midlands Rent 
103 5 0 East Rent 
104 5 0 London Rent 
105 5 0 South East Rent 
106 5 0 South West Rent 
107 3 0 England excluding London Rent 
108 1 0 House to income  
109 5 0 UK HP 
110 5 0 Wales  HP 
111 5 0 Scotland HP 
112 5 0 Northern Ireland HP 
113 5 0 England HP 
114 5 0 North East HP 
115 5 0 North West HP 
116 5 0 Yorkshire and The Humber HP 
117 5 0 East Midlands HP 
118 5 0 West Midlands HP 
119 5 0 East HP 
120 5 0 London HP 
121 5 0 South East HP 
122 5 0 South West HP 
123 5 1 VOLATILITY 30 Day 
124 5 1 FTSE  
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125 5 1 Effective exchange rate index 
126 5 1 £ to $CD 
127 5 1 £ to € 
128 5 1 £ to $US 
129 5 1 £ to ¥ 
130 1 1 Corporate (BBB) 
131 1 1 Government 10 year  
132 1 1 Lifetime Tracker mortgage 
133 2 1 Variable rate  
134 1 1 Sterling LIBOR(3 month) 
135 1 1 (90 per cent LTV) fixed rate 2 year 
136 1 1 (75 per cent LTV) fixed rate  5 year 
 
Variable Transcode  Name  
1 4 Observable  GDP 
2 4 Observable CPI 
3 1 Observable QE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
59 
 
APPENDIX B: Open Economy 
 
Figure 1-19: A-Results with NEER as Control Variable (Overview Open 
economy) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is included as a control 
variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 
as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-20: B- Results with NEER as Control Variable (Housing Market) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is included as a control 
variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 
as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-21: C- Results with NEER as a Control Variable (House price 
England) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is included as a control 
variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 
as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-22: D- Results with NEER as Control Variable. (Financial market 
and Lending) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is included as a control 
variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 
as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-23: A- Results with spread between the Italian to German 10-year 
Gov. Bond Yield as Control Variable (Macroeconomic Overview) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The spread between the Italian to German 10-year Gov. Bond Yield is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses 
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Figure 1-24: B- Results with spread between the Italian to German 10-year 
Gov. Bond Yield as Control Variable (Housing Market) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The spread between the Italian to German 10-year Gov. Bond Yield is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-25: C- Results with spread between the Italian to German 10-year 
Gov. Bond Yield as Control Variable (House Prices England) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The spread between the Italian to German 10-year Gov. Bond Yield is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses 
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Figure 1-26: D- Results with spread between the Italian to German 10-year 
Gov. Bond Yield as Control Variable (Financial Market and Lending) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases 
as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for 
recursive identification. The spread between the Italian to German 10-year Gov. Bond Yield is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, 
with the first 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses 
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Figure 1-27: A- Results with oil price as Control Variable (Macroeconomic 
Overview)  
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The oil price is included 
as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, 
were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-28: B- Results with oil price as Control Variable (Housing Market)  
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The oil price is included 
as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, 
were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-29: C- Results with oil price as Control Variable. (House price England) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The oil price is included 
as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, 
were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-30: D- Results with oil price as Control Variable (Financial Market and 
Lending) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The oil price is included 
as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as burn-in, 
were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-31: A- Results with assets purchases by other central banks as Control 
Variable (Macroeconomic Overview) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The assets purchases by 
Federal Reserve, ECB and Bank of Japan as share of respected GDP, using principal component to take the first factor, is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-32: B- Results with assets purchases by other central banks as Control 
Variable (Housing Market) 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The assets purchases by 
Federal Reserve, ECB and Bank of Japan as share of respected GDP, using principal component to take the first factor, is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-33: C- Results with assets purchases by other central banks as Control 
Variable (House Price England) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The assets purchases by 
Federal Reserve, ECB and Bank of Japan as share of respected GDP, using principal component to take the first factor, is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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Figure 1-34: D- Results with asset purchases by other central banks as Control 
Variable (House price England) (Financial market and Lending) 
 
 
This figure shows the median impulse responses in response to one per cent asset purchase increases as a fraction of 2009Q1 
GDP, together with 68 per cent Bayesian credible sets. We show results for recursive identification. The assets purchases by 
Federal Reserve, ECB and Bank of Japan as share of respected GDP, using principal component to take the first factor, is 
included as a control variable and placed last as part of the observable variable. 15000 simulations, with the first 10,000 as 
burn-in, were used to generate the responses. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Since the recent financial crisis, systemic risk in the asset management sector has 
been a focus for policy makers at the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2014), academics 
and market representatives such as the Investment Company Institute (Sean Collins 
and L. Christopher Plantier 2014). 
The UK is the second largest market for asset management after the US, with £6.8 
trillion under management in 2015. The UK has more in assets under management 
than the combined amount in the next three largest European countries, and the 
trend has increased.  
Increases in investment in the sector lead to price increases and this leads to further 
investment in the sector, which creates a “feedback effect” and possibly price 
volatility, which may have implications in the real economy.  
In this chapter, building on the growing literature on the importance of the asset 
management sector in well-functioning capital markets, we investigate whether the 
asset manager contributes to financial instability, using unique monthly data from 
the UK Investment Management Association (IMA).  
This chapter follows Feroli et al. (2014), who applied their model to the US data. 
We apply their methodology to UK data but include more categories of assets and 
different classes of bonds. This enables us to include the external environment in 
their model and investigate asset movements between the domestic and 
international market. In addition, we look at how investors switch between equities 
and bonds after the monetary policy shock.    
Following Feroli et al. (2014), we first investigate whether a feedback effect 
whereby investment flows increase the price and at the same time the price 
encourages further investment exists in UK bond and equity markets (Remolona, 
Kleiman, and Gruenstein, 1997 and Feroli et al., 2014). 
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Second, we identify monetary policy shock and look at the connection between 
monetary policy, flows and prices in the bond markets. Change in monetary policy 
has an impact on investors’ decisions, so it can prompt large inflows and outflows. 
In particular, a rise in policy rate that decreases prices and increases the risk 
premium, pushes investor demand for risky assets down. This will be studied by 
three-variable VARs.  
Third, we extend the analysis to investors in an open economy and look at whether 
they favour domestic or foreign bonds. Domestic and foreign bonds may not be 
exact equivalents due to the difference in default risk or exchange rate risk. In 
addition, we look at whether investors have switched their portfolios between the 
bond and equity markets due to monetary policy shock in the UK. We use a vector 
auto-regression (VAR) model. 
The asset management sector with products such as open-end, mutual and hedge 
funds is increasing in size and number and globally there is $76tn under 
management. This is 40 per cent more than a decade ago, and is equivalent to the 
size of the world economy today (IMF April 2015)5.  The trend is shown in Figure 
2-1.  
Financial assets that are partly managed by unleveraged institutions are projected 
to reach $400 trillion by 2050 (Haldane, 2014). The value of assets under the 
management of the largest global investment firms is now almost the same as the 
value of assets held by the largest international banks (Haldane, 2014). According 
to the Financial Times, BlackRock handled around $4.7tn in 2015: this reflects a 
structural shift in the financial system that moves risk from banks to the asset 
management sector. 
 
 
                                                          
5 The size of the nominal GDP for the world is around $74 trillion according the World Bank 
estimate for 2015. 
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Figure 2-1: Global asset manager assets under management and world GDP, 
annual 2000-2013 
Source: IMF  
The main driver for this sector is asset manager and investor behaviour, which may 
lead to herding and fire sales with implications for the real economy. In this respect 
there are two important risk channels: the incentive problem for managers and ‘run 
risk’ or first mover advantage. 
The asset manager (agent) is delegated by the investor (principal) to manage capital. 
The incentives for the manager might encourage destabilising behaviour and 
amplify shock. For example, manager compensation can be linked to relative 
performance or the investor injecting money into funds that perform better relative 
to the benchmark (Ma, Tang and Gomez 2013; IMF, 2015). These factors reward 
asset managers for taking excessive risks and may encourage herding (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990, Arora and Yang, 2001; Maug and Naik, 2011; Feroli et al., 2014; 
IMF , 2015).  
The second risk channel is a ‘run risk’ which is called ‘first mover advantage.’ It 
can arise when the principal or asset owner does not want to be last in the queue: if 
others are redeeming from a fund they should do so as well, which may lead to fire 
sale dynamics (Feroli 2014, Shin and Moris, 2014 and IMF, 2015). These two risk 
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channels are not mutually exclusive and we will use the word ‘investors’ for both 
managers and asset owners interchangeably. 
To look at these risks in action, assume that as a result of economic shock an asset 
manager motivated by compensation or an investor seeking the ‘first mover 
advantage’ sells their securities. The sale pushes asset prices further, and induces 
more investor flight (herding), redemptions and falling prices. If this is large enough 
to generate a feedback effect, the process can destabilise financial markets and 
dampen global economic growth (ICI, 2014).  
In this context, Buffa et al. (2014) investigate the theory of how benchmark 
performance measures lead to exacerbating price distortions. Morris and Shin 
(2014) have also investigated the possibility that short-term incentive outweighs 
long-term fundamental value using a global game model. Building on this, Feroli 
et al. (2014) set up a model that evaluates performance relative to a benchmark, 
which will create an incentive for the fund manager to sell during a downturn and 
chase yields during upturns. 
They applied their model to the US data. They found evidence of a feedback effect 
from bond fund flows to bond market price in four categories of the bond market, 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), High Yield Bonds (HY), Investment Grade 
Bonds (IG), and Emerging Market Bonds (EM). They also investigated how 
monetary policy stance impacts the behaviour of asset managers. For instance, low 
short-term rates prior to 2013 encouraged asset managers who were concerned with 
their relative performance rankings to seek higher risk in the search for yield. This 
may have compressed the risk premium and created a source of financial instability 
when the Fed tapered off one of their QE programmes. This demonstrates that 
monetary policies such as forward guidance may encourage risk taking and leads to 
a risk reversal when the monetary authorities change their stance. They found that 
monetary shocks can drive flows, and flows can drive prices. In particular, in the 
three-variable VAR they found that due to tightening monetary policy the bond 
flows and prices responded negatively.  
We investigate the existence of such a loop in the UK asset market. Following 
Feroli et al. (2014) the benchmark model bivariate VAR results in this paper show 
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there is no “feedback effect” in the UK bond market, while we can see a very weak 
effect in five categories in the equity market. The effect is not statistically 
significant. In addition, one of the central hypotheses from Feroli et al. (2014) is 
that monetary policy shock can prompt large shifts in bond market sentiment, 
moving both flows and price. To some extent, our benchmark models with three-
variable VAR results are consistent with their findings. A surprise monetary policy 
tightening prompts outflow and a fall in price in the bond market. However within 
the same framework, when we look at impact of flows and price shocks we do not 
see a positive response on price due to the flow shock, in contrast to Feroli et al. 
(2014). Moreover, the response of the bond flows to the price shock in our findings 
is stronger and more statistically significant than in theirs.   
As a robustness check, we use different data sets to investigate the feedback effect 
in benchmark models in both a bivariate and a three-variable VAR. We use a data 
set with a wider category of bonds, including high frequency daily data from 2013 
to September 2016. The result confirms our benchmark result in both the bivariate 
and trivariate VAR and there is no significant change in the results. In particular, 
we have found no evidence of a positive “feedback effect” in the bivariate VAR. In 
the trivariate VAR, as a result of monetary policy tightening and a rise in rates we 
see outflow from the bond market and falls in prices. However, the magnitude of 
responses and statistical significance are different compared to the benchmark 
results.  
On the question of how investors shift between domestic and foreign assets in the 
bond market due to the monetary policy shock in an open economy, we find that as 
a result of a surprise tightening, both domestic bond flows and prices respond 
negatively. However, foreign bond flows respond ambiguously and are not 
significant while their price responds negatively and exchange rates are increasing.  
One explanation for the outflow from domestic bonds could be the investor’s rush 
to redeem the fund and avoid portfolio losses stemming from unexpected rate 
increases and falls in price (ICI, 2016). This is also consistent with the model’s 
predictions: according to Feroli et al. (2014) monetary tightening is likely to set off 
outflow from the bond market because the demand for risky assets is reduced, due 
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to higher risk premiums. The results for the bond market are also consistent with 
the narrative description of the event in corporate and other bonds after the Bank of 
England introduced QE (Joyce et al., 2011). In addition, Joyce et al. (2011) reported 
that due to QE investors switched to corporate bonds, other bonds, and equity. 
However as we increase the rate, the investor should sell off the corporate bonds. 
We should note that corporate bonds compromise around 50 per cent of the bond 
market in our data set. In addition, the domestic sector has only corporate bonds. 
On the question of how the investor switches between equity and bonds, we find 
that due to tightening monetary policy in the UK, there is an outflow and fall in 
price in the bond market and inflows and fall in prices in equities. We also see an 
increase in exchange rates. Falls in price in both the bond and equity markets are 
statistically significant while the outflows from bonds and inflows into equities are 
not significant. Nevertheless, the outflow from the bond and inflow into the equity 
market is consistent with a recent study of the impact of monetary policy tightening 
on the mutual fund market in US by Banegas et al. (2016). Furthermore, a fall in 
the price of equities due to monetary policy tightening is in line with Michael 
Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (2004), Bernanke (2003), Laeven, and Tong 
(2010). The overall result in the benchmark model with monetary policy and an 
open economy supports the first mover advantage because the investors rush to 
redeem as the risk premium increases to avoid portfolio losses.  
We use sign restriction to check our results in the open economy bond market: in 
this, we are imposing restrictions only on the monetary surprise, domestic price and 
exchange rate while leaving unrestricted the domestic flows, foreign flows and 
foreign price. We investigate whether our domestic flows or foreign flows and price 
will support our unrestricted model.  
The result for domestic bonds holds when using sign restriction in which a surprise 
monetary tightening is associated with outflows, while the result for foreign bonds 
flows falls and is still significant, while the price is falling as before and significant. 
 
82 
 
2.2 Data  
 
In this section, we describe our data and the creation of market changes (price), and 
provide statistical information.  
2.2.1.1Data Collection 
 
The main data comes from the Investment Management Association (IMA)6. The 
IMA is the trade body that represents UK investment managers and it has about 200 
members. IMA members include large, medium and small asset management firms, 
fund managers, specialist and private client managers and Occupational Pension 
Scheme (OPS) managers. These entities could be domestic or international. 
However, our data focuses on the UK-domiciled authorised investment funds. This 
includes authorised unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs).  
We collected data from information published every month by the IMA website. 
We selected a month (e.g. December), a year (e.g. 2015) and a category (e.g. fund 
under management and sale). We present an example of this data in Appendix A. 
The data captures holdings (funds under management) and flows (net sales) for 
individual funds on a monthly basis. For example in 2014 the Investment 
Association collected this data for 2,513 funds domiciled in the UK. The IMA 
recorded data for at least 53 headings (sectors) on a monthly basis from 2005 to 
2016 (Figure 2-2). After cleaning up the data, we have 32 headings that correspond 
to different sectors. The data can be split between retail and institutional investment, 
but we use aggregate data, which includes both.  
2.2.1.2 Cleaning IMA data 
 
To have consistent data across different sectors, we remove those sectors which are 
missing either at the beginning of the sample (Jan 2005) or at the end (December 
                                                          
6 Recently Investment Management Association name has changed to The Investment Association 
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2015). Some sectors are discontinued, some new sectors are added, while some 
have merged, so we categorise them as residual and name them “other xxx.” We 
have noted the total funds for each sector: equity, fixed income, money market and 
flexible investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Monthly Data Profile Chart 
This data file is based on information from the IMA website: 
http://www.investmentfunds.org.uk/fund-statistics/full-figures/. 
As shown in Figure 2-2, we have wider categories in the equity market compared 
to Feroli et al. (2014), and limited categories in the bond market. However the time 
span is shorter (containing data from 2005 to 2015) and we also use a monthly 
frequency, whereas Feroli et al. (2014) used a weekly frequency.  
2.2.1.3 Daily Data comparable to IMA  
 
To address the limitation of our analysis in terms of frequency, we have collected 
daily data from Thomson Reuters Eikon’s global flow of funds: they also provide 
data for Lipper, the same database from which Feroli et al. (2014) collected their 
data. The time span for daily data is limited, and ours covers November 2013 to 
September 2016. Our daily data in the bond market has more categories of bonds 
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than our monthly data, while equity is very limited in terms of categories. We try 
to match the daily data from Thomson Reuters Eikon's global flow of funds to our 
monthly IMA data as closely as possible. We collected the following data in the 
bond and equity market.  
Bond market daily: Emerging Markets Global HC, Emerging Markets Global LC, 
Bond GBP, GBP Corporates, GBP Government, GBP High Yield, GBP Inflation 
Linked, GBP Short Term, Global, Global High Yield. 
Equity market daily: Emerging Markets Global, Europe ex UK, Global ex UK, 
Equity UK 
2.2.1.4 Data for estimating monetary policy 
surprise  
 
To measure the monetary policy stance for the UK, we follow the methodology 
employed by Wright (2012). This methodology was also employed by Feroli et al. 
(2014) to create monetary policy surprise in their estimations. We collected data on 
the monetary policy decision date, 10-year government bond yield, 2-year 
government bond yield, 5-year real rate, the 10-year real rate, and the BBB 
Corporate and AAA corporate. The source of data is the Bank of England and 
Thomson DataStream on a daily frequency. Our collected data is nearly comparable 
to the data used by Wright. However, due to the lack of data for TIPS breakeven, 
5–10-year forward TIPS breakeven and BAA in our collected data, we collected 
data on a 5-year real rate, on a 10-year real rate and BBB to fill the missing data 
set.  
2.2.1.5 Exchange rate data 
 
In the extension of our VAR model, we also include the UK pound exchange rate 
(in log difference) to examine the international dimension of risk-taking channels. 
The UK pound exchange rate is measured by the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) of the pound sterling, obtained from the Bank of England database on a 
monthly frequency. 
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2.2.2. Data Construction for Change in 
Market Value 
 
To prepare data for the analysis, we followed Feroli et al. (2014) closely. We 
collected the following data on a monthly basis from 2005 to the end of December 
2015:  
 Total assets (Funds Under Management (FUM)) 
 Net sale (Flow) 
The objective was to create a data set comparable to that of Feroli et al. (2014) who 
constructed the following identity for US mutual funds from the Lipper database: 
We will create a comparable data identity to Feroli et al. (2014) based on the IMA 
data for the UK-domiciled authorised investment funds. This includes unit trusts 
and OEICs for the UK.  
As we indicated above, we have the ingredients for the construction of such a data 
set, (e.g.  ‘FUM’ is the ‘Total Assets’ and ‘Net sale’ is ‘fund flows’) and we will 
have an identity comparable to Feroli’s. However, we are missing one variable from 
this equation, which we will compute based on the available information. The 
computed Change in Market Values of Assets t will be as follows: 
We have two important variables. This first is ‘flows’ and the second is the ‘Change 
in market value of assets’ which is a measure of price in our analysis. We should 
also note that ‘Change in market value of assets’ reflects part of the total return 
because from the investor's point of view, the total return in the bond market 
consists of interest income and the change in the market value of assets in given 
periods, as follows: 
Total return= price of return + income return. 
   Feroli        Assetst+1 = Fund Flowst +Change in Market value of Assetst+ Assetst 
This P         FUMt+1 = Net salet (Flow) +Change in Market value of Assetst + FUMt 
  This P     Change in Market value of Assets t =FUMt+1 -Net sale t(flowt)  - FUMt 
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The interest return is driven by the coupon the bond pays over the given periods 
and the price return is based on the change in the market price, which is sensitive 
to the yield demanded by investors and the duration or amortisation of bonds that 
trade at a discount (premium). In this paper, we do not distinguish between the two 
parts of the returns. We take ‘Change in market value of assets’, which is a measure 
of price, to refer to price in both equity and bond markets. 
 
2.2.2.1 Remove outliers  
 
In the raw data, we observe some abrupt increases or decreases that cannot be 
explained by any particular event. These could be due to some merging, dissolving 
or misreporting of the fund. To have consistent data, define outliers as three 
standard deviations from the median. We then identify the position of the outlier in 
each vector of the time series, remove the outliers and linearly interpolate over their 
positions using the closest values that are not outliers. Using a median for removing 
outliers has an advantage over using the mean, as discussed in Leys et al. (2013).  
 
2.2.2.2 Market value changes (Price) in 
comparison to IMA returns and select market 
price changes 
 
After constructing the market value and removing the outliers, we compare our 
data, price, to the monthly return data published by the IMA. The IMA-published 
data leads by one period. For example, my calculated price return for Jan 2005 
matches closely to the IMA return for Feb 2005. This could be because the IMA 
reports end-of-month performance while we calculate it at the beginning of the 
month, using the formula in part 2.2.2.2. However, matching our data to one period 
ahead will increase the correlation between my calculated returns and those of the 
IMA. Figure 2-3 below displays the correlation between the calculation of market 
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changes and IMA returns, and shows that the majority of the sector is highly 
correlated. Figure 2-4 presents a comparison between the calculated market changes 
(price) and a few selected market returns from DataStream. Figures 2-3 and 2-4 
both confirm that our calculation is a good proxy for capturing the market price.
 
Figure 2-3: Correlation between market changes calculation (price) and 
returns, as published by IMA sectors 
 
Figure 2-4: Correlation between market changes calculation (price) and 
selected market returns 
Source: DataStream 
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2.2.3. Statistical analysis  
 
Below we present an overview of our data and compare the profile of each sector 
for the period 2005 and 2015. In addition, we analyse the market risk premium in 
both flows and the price in both the equity and bond markets. We compare flows 
and price correlation in each category.  
2.2.3.1. Overview of the total assets under 
management  
 
Figure 2-5 shows that UK-authorised funds reached £971 billion at the end of 
December 2015. During the crisis funds under management fell, and started 
recovering at the beginning of 2009 after the Bank of England commenced QE. 
 
Figure 2-5: Total Managed in UK-Authorised Funds (OEICS and unit trusts) 
(£ Billion) 
Source: Investment Management Association (IMA). 
The raw monthly funds under management as the share of total assets for each 
sector is presented in Figure 2-6. We can see that the equity market is the largest, 
followed by fixed income, mixed assets and the money market. Over the intense 
period of the crisis from 2007 to 2009, uncertainty caused the equity trend to 
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decrease and the bond market share - considered as ‘safe assets’ – to increase. The 
introduction of QE at the beginning of 2009 reduced yields in the bond market and 
it lost market share. At the same time, the equity market has become more stable at 
53-58 per cent of the total share of assets while the bond market is still trending 
downward. It reverted to its pre-crisis level (around 14 per cent of total assets) at 
the end of 2015.  This is in line with the aim of QE: purchasing government bonds 
(gilts), increasing liquidity in the market by returning money to investors and taking 
back the bond. The asset managers, instead of holding cash, invested in corporate 
bonds, foreign assets, and equity (Joyce at al., 2011). In particular, purchasing 
corporate bonds stabilised the corporate bond share of total bonds, which we can 
see in Figure 2-7, while government bonds disappeared from the investor balance 
sheet.   
 
Figure 2-6: Share of total funds under management in each sector over total 
assets in industry 
Please note the jump in the mixed assets is due to the redefining classification by the IMA 
https://www.theinvestmentassociation.org/assets/files/sectors/20150205-
classificationofoutcomefocusedfunds.pdf 
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Figure 2-7: Share of total bonds under management in each sector over total 
bond market 
2.2.3.2 The bond and equity markets 
 
In this paper we are focusing on the bond and equity markets. In February 2007, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) stated that it would no 
longer buy the “most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities” 
(FED).7 This was the start of the financial crisis. Figure 2-8 shows the volatility 
(standard deviation) and mean flows for the bond and equity markets. The market 
risk premium, which reflects uncertainty, has increased in both markets in the post-
crisis period. In addition, since the start of the crisis in 2007, comparing the black 
line in the bond and equity markets, on average, the bond market flow decreased 
and the equity market flow increased. During the intense period of the crisis, 
2007M2 to the start of QE in 2009, the equity market flow fell in favour of the bond 
markets, which were perceived as safer.  
                                                          
7 https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline 
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Figure 2-8: Volatility and mean flows in the bond and equity markets 
Figure 2-9 illustrates the market changes, a measure of price, and the means in both 
the bond and equity markets. In the post-crisis period, the mean price in the bond 
market increased slightly in line with the interest rate decline; equity prices fell in 
line with the impact of recession. However, equity prices recovered after the 
recession and particularly since QE. Overall, volatility in the bond and equity 
market price increased, which is consistent with the uncertainty in the financial 
market. The fluctuation in bond market prices and the volatility spike in February 
of 2014 came from the gilt market. The Bank of England announcement intended 
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to maintain the stock of purchased assets and reinvest the cash flow associated with 
all maturing gilts held in the APF, to help the economy recover (Bank of England 
2015). 
 
Figure 2-9: Price volatility and mean price in the bond and equity markets 
From Figure 2-7, we can see a decrease in the share of bonds since 2009. This could 
be due to the low interest rate in the bond market and the government purchase of 
government bonds as part of QE. Nevertheless, comparing Figure 2-6 and Figure 
2-9 shows that investors may switch to other asset types such as equity, where prices 
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are higher. As part of our analysis, we will look at the impact of monetary policy 
on bonds and equity in the extension of the model in Part 2.5.  
We present the individual categories’ flow and price volatility in both markets in 
Figure 2-10. Post-crisis volatility has reduced some sector flows in the equity 
market, including North America, small Japanese companies and specialist equity 
markets, while in the bond market sub-individual volatility has increased. 
Full statistical information about the funds under management and correlation for 
flows pre-and post-crisis in bonds and equity are presented in Appendix B: Tables 
1 to 3.  Looking at the individual sector correlation in table 1 (pre-crisis) and table 
2 (post-crisis) we can see that overall, the correlation between the equity market 
and bond flow has increased post-crisis. 
Before we set up the bivariate VAR (Benchmark analysis, parts 2.4) we look at the 
correlation between flows and prices in individual categories. Figure 2-11 shows 
this correlation, as we can see that just four categories in our data have a positive 
correlation with the prices. This includes Asia Pacific (excluding Japan), smaller 
European companies, specialist companies, and smaller UK companies. This shows 
some evidence of a positive feedback effect between flows and prices in these four 
sectors in the equity market. In other words, increases in one of them will lead to 
increases in other variables. In the bivariate VAR, these four categories exhibit a 
weak feedback effect. Most sectors in the equity and bond markets show a negative 
correlation, which may indicate that the market is in equilibrium and increases in 
quantity lead to a fall in prices. We will address this in our empirical analysis. 
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Figure 2-10: The individual categories’ flows and price volatility in both 
markets 
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Figure 2-11: Correlation between flows and prices in all categories in the 
bond and equity markets 
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2.3 Empirical Framework  
 
2.3.1 Empirical Framework 
 
 
Our empirical investigation is based on the vector autoregression (VAR), firstly in 
bivariate VAR [Flow Price] which examines the dynamic relationship (feedback 
effect) between flows (quantity) and market changes (price) in both the bond and 
equity markets using monthly data from the IMA. We first test to see if a positive 
feedback exists between fund flows and price in both equity and bond markets. 
Next we estimate monetary policy surprise following the Wright (2012) 
methodology, using daily data. This, together with first principal components of 
flows and price in the bond market, will create a three-variable VAR [MP Flow 
Price]. Note that our bond market is limited compared to Feroli et al. (2014). We 
have just corporate bonds, global bonds and other bonds. The corporate bond is 
nearly half of the total bond trading in the bond mark in our data set while global 
bonds are less than 10 per cent, other bonds are 20 per cent, and the rest are 
government bonds.   
In combination, monetary policy, flow and price will create a three-variable VAR. 
In this we are looking at the connection between monetary policies, flows and prices 
in the bond market. We label these two models (bivariate VAR and trivariate VAR) 
as benchmark models. They will be estimated and discussed in section 3 of the 
benchmark model estimation. 
Thirdly, similarly, we will expand the analysis by splitting the bond market into the 
domestic (corporate bond and other bonds) and foreign sectors (global bonds). We 
also include the UK pound exchange rate (in log difference) in our model to 
examine the international dimension of risk-taking channels and cross-border 
effects.   
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Fourthly, we look at how investors choose between equity and bond markets. In 
particular, we will look at whether investors choose bonds or equity when the 
central bank increases the rate. 
Finally, for a robustness check, we will repeat the main estimation (bivariate and 
trivariate VAR) using the daily frequency. This includes bivariate model estimation 
and trivariate estimations. We also use sign restriction to check our result in the 
extension of the model for open economy bond markets. 
 
2.4 Main estimation (Benchmark) 
 
2.4.1 The feedback effect in bivariate VAR 
 
First, we look for evidence of the feedback effect in UK data, employing bivariate 
vector auto regression in 20 categories: 16 equity markets and 4 bond markets.  
The setup of the VAR following Feroli et al. (2014) is as follows for all categories 
in both the bond and equity markets.  
[
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
 ] = [
𝐶
𝐶
] + [
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
] + [
    (∑ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡)/𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−13    
𝑡−13
𝑡
(∑ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡
𝑡−13
𝑡 )/𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑡−13
] + [
𝑒1𝑡
𝑒2𝑡
]  (2-1) 
In this model, ordering flows first reflects the decisions of investors or of their 
portfolio managers in driving the flow that could trigger the destabilising dynamics. 
Additionally, the shock to flow in a given month is exogenous to change in the 
valuation in that month. In each of the VARs, Cholesky decomposition used for 
identification includes a 4-month lag of flows and market changes (price) which is 
scaled by total asset at the beginning of the periods, as well as a 1-year accumulation 
of past fund inflows, normalised by the asset at the beginning of the period as a 
control indicator that proxies for sustained fund accumulation.  
The findings from these exercises and their individual impulse response are in 
Figures 2-12 to 2-22 in part 2.4.2 (Individual bivariate VAR results). We report the 
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specific regression coefficients and other summary statistics in the appendix D, 
table 1. 
In nearly all categories in the equity and bond markets, flows respond positively to 
the increase in price. This is in line with the literature such as Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Feroli et al. (2014). However, there was no 
response to bond market price from flow shocks, while in the equity market the 
response of price to flow shocks is very weak, and positive for the following 
categories: Asia Pacific excluding Japan, European smaller companies, specialist, 
and UK smaller companies. 
This confirms a weak feedback effect in some of the categories in the equity market. 
These four sectors also have a positive correlation between price and flows, as 
shown in Figure 2-11 in our preliminary data analysis. 
As demonstrated, we are unable to support the positive feedback effect for all 
categories and specifically in the bond market. The bond market results are in line 
with a recent study by Ramos-Francia et al. (2017) in which they test the first 
implication of Feroli et al.’s (2014) model using bond flow and CDS as their proxy 
for price for 20 advanced economies, including the UK. However, there is a partial 
positive feedback loop between prices and quantities in the equity market.  
As suggested by Feroli et al. (2014), the lack of a feedback effect could be due to 
high liquidity in these markets, which makes them less likely to face sudden 
reversals because of investors who rush to sell illiquid assets first, or because of 
identification issues in using monthly frequency.  Specifically, Feroli et al. (2014) 
claimed that “…over the course of the month, there are likely to be some 
fundamental shocks that could lead to both higher inflows and higher returns. So 
using a Cholesky ordering to identify a feedback loop between flows and returns 
for monthly data would not be convincing. Ideally, we would have liked to have 
used even higher frequency data (such as daily observations) to test for the feedback 
loop. At the daily frequency, it would be even easier to defend the assumption that 
flow movements cause price adjustments.” 
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To capture a feedback effect it would be good to use daily data as Feroli et al. (2014) 
suggested. Specifically, for robustness, we investigate frequency using daily data 
but the result did not change significantly. We present the full evidence of the daily 
result in section 5. 
 
2.4.2 Individual bivariate VAR results.  
 
Figures 2-12 to 2-22 present the VAR impulse response for individual categories 
following Feroli et al. (2014) based on a Cholesky ordering. For each of the 
categories of the fund, there is a panel of four charts that show cumulative impulse 
response over 18 months to one standard deviation shock in flows to flows (top 
left), flows to price (top right), price to flows (bottom left), and price to price 
(bottom right). For there to be a feedback effect we should observe diagonal 
increases in both flows and price which is price to flows (bottom left) and flows to 
price (top right). Furthermore, the vertical scale displays the flows and price over 
the assets at the beginning of the month (or last periods). To generate such an 
impulse response, we used Monte Carlo simulations of 1000 repetitions. The 
cumulative response is shown in red and two standard deviation bandwidth in blue. 
Below we present the selected individual categories in bond and equity markets. 
Specifically, we present all individual bond markets, but from equity markets only 
those categories that show a positive feedback effect. We also present the aggregate 
sector response in each market.  
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Figure 2-12: Asia Pacific Excluding Japan* 
*This sector shows feedback effect 
 
Figure 2-13: European Smaller Companies * 
*This sector shows feedback effect 
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Figure 2-14: Specialist* 
 
Figure 2-15: UK Smaller Companies* 
*This sector shows feedback effect 
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Figure 2-16:£ Corporate Bonds. 
 
Figure 2-17: Global Bonds. 
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Figure 2-18: UK Gilts. 
 
 
Figure 2-19: UK Index Linked Gilts. 
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Figure 2-20: Other Fixed Income. 
 
 
Figure 2-21: Total Fixed Income. 
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Figure 2-22: Total Equity. 
 
It is clear that there is little evidence for a full feedback effect in the bond market, 
whereas a weak feedback effect appears in some equity market categories. This also 
evident from the aggregate data results in Figure 2-21 and 2-22. Full results for 
those categories in equity that do not show a feedback effect can be found in 
Appendix C, Figures 1 to 13, and the full statistical summary such as confidence 
and standard error for bivariate VAR can be found in Appendix D.  
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2.4.3 Monetary policy identification and the 
feedback effect  
 
Feroli et al. (2014) propose that monetary policy can change market perception, 
which can move both flows and prices. The paper also suggests that market 
participants will accommodate big changes in the monetary policy stance. This 
includes a case of a large accumulation of price driving inflows, and if the monetary 
policy stance shifts direction, it then leads to a large outflow. The analysis predicts 
that monetary policy can drive flows, and flows can drive prices. 
To measure the monetary policy stance for the UK we follow Wright (2012). The 
full description of the methodology, which Feroli et al. (2014) also used to create 
monetary policy surprise in their estimations, is in Appendix E. To estimate the 
monetary policy surprise, we use daily frequency data on 10-year government 
bonds real and nominal, 2-year nominal government bonds, and 5-year real 
government bond, BBB corporate and AAA corporate bonds.  
To estimate monetary policy surprise we lowered the 10-year government bonds by 
25 basis points and estimated the structural shock on a daily frequency, to be 
consistent with Wright (2012). We took these daily observations and matched them 
against the policy event.  On the day of the policy announcement, we select the 
impact of the shock; otherwise, we put zero. In this way, we could isolate the 
monetary policy shock to that day. In our sample, we have at least one policy 
announcement in a given month. As the structural shock on that specific day is 
matched to the policy announcement of that day, we call that structural shock our 
monetary policy surprise in that month (e.g. if we had an announcement on 15 Jan 
2012, then we searched for the structural shock on 15 Jan 2012 in the daily shock). 
If we had two or more announcements, we averaged the structural shock size on 
those days and called it monetary policy shock for that month.  
To test the connection between monetary policy, flows, and price, we set up a three-
variable VAR that includes monetary policy surprise, the first principal components 
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flows and price of bonds. This includes corporate8, global9 and other bonds; we 
exclude gilts and the gilt index as Feroli et al. (2014) did not include government 
bonds, due to the lack of positive feedback in bivariate VAR.  Feroli et al. (2014) 
only included bonds for which there was a positive feedback effect in the bivariate 
VAR model. However, despite lacking a positive feedback effect in our bivariate 
VAR estimation for corporate bonds, global bonds and other bonds, for testing the 
model in a monetary policy context we selected bond categories which are a close 
substitute to those bond categories that Feroli et al. (2014) used in their paper. 
The data is monthly from January 2005 to December 2015. We order monetary 
policy shock first, then flow and prices. Ordering monetary policy first ensures the 
exogeneity of the monetary policy surprise. As we discussed in the bivariate VAR 
section, putting flows before the price would ensure flows as a driver of price. Both 
flow and prices are scaled to the total assets under management in each sector. 
Figures 2- 23 and 2-24 show the result presented by the impulse response of VAR 
using Monte Carlo simulations of 1000 repetitions. While the first figures show the 
instantaneous response, the second shows the accumulation response to the 
monetary policy shock. The time period, 18 months, is on the horizontal axis the 
vertical axis shows the response to the one-unit shock of each variable. 
                                                          
8 “Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in Sterling denominated (or hedged back to 
Sterling), Triple BBB minus or above corporate bond securities (as measured by Standard & Poors 
or an equivalent external rating agency). This excludes convertibles, preference shares and 
permanent interest bearing shares (PIBs)”. (IMA) 
 
9 “Funds which invest at least 80% of their assets in fixed interest securities. All funds which contain 
more than 80% fixed interest investments are to be classified under this heading regardless of the 
fact that they may have more than 80% in a particular geographic sector, unless that geographic area 
is the UK or GEM, when the fund should be classified under the relevant UK (Sterling) or GEM 
heading. This sector has a wide range of funds, which invest in bonds and currencies across 
geographic areas with differing characteristics”. ( adapted from IMA) 
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Figure 2-23: Instantaneous Response to Monetary Surprise, Monthly data. 
The impact of monetary surprise illustrated by instantaneous impulse response in three variable 
VAR identified by a Cholesky ordering with the Monetary surprise first, flow second and return 
third. The 84 percentile bands are shown. 
 
Figure 2-24: Accumulation Response to Monetary Surprise, Monthly data. 
The impact of monetary surprise illustrated by cumulative impulse response in three variable VAR 
identified by a Cholesky ordering with the monetary surprise first, flow second and return third. The 
84 percentile bands are shown. 
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From these figures we can infer: 
• A surprise tightening of monetary policy prompts a negative response to 
both flows and prices (column 1, rows 2 and 3). This is consistent with Feroli et al. 
(2014).  
• The response of the flow to price shock (row 2, column 3) is statistically 
significant. The response is similar to the bivariate VAR studied earlier. This shows 
that price is an incentive for the majority of the fund inflows. This is in line with 
the previous literature: Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and 
Feroli et al. (2014). 
• Price shows an immediate negative response to flows shock (column 2, row 
3). However, it will increase over time. The initial response of the price is not 
similar to Feroli et al. (2014).  
From these results, using UK monthly data, we can confirm that the impact of 
monetary policy is similar to Feroli et al.’s (2014) model outcome except the 
response of prices to the flows. In our analysis, increases in flows and decreases in 
initial prices can be due to equilibrium in the market. As the flows, a measure of 
quantity, increase, and price should fall. Furthermore, if we look at the cumulative 
response (Figure 2-24) we can see that over time the price increases as the flow 
increases. This is consistent with the model outcome.  
We test this further by increasing the size of universe (more categories of bond) and 
using high frequency data from November 2013 to September 2016 from Thomson 
Reuter Eikon's global flow. We found that the overall result is the same and in 
particular, monetary policy tightening causes outflow and price falls in line with 
expectations of the model. We provide the detail for this exercise in the robustness 
check analysis in part 2.6. 
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2.5 Extended analysis   
 
2.5.1 The Bond Market in an Open 
Economy  
 
We next look at how investors in a small open economy such as the UK, react to a 
monetary policy shock in the bond market. We split the bond market data into 
domestic - corporate and other bonds, and global bonds. We include the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) (in log difference) in our model to capture the 
international dimension of risk-taking channels. The UK pound exchange rate is 
measured by the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the pound sterling, 
which is a trade-weighted index of the value of the pound, obtained from the Bank 
of England database.  An increase in NEER indicates an appreciation in the pound 
sterling relative to its trade-weighted basket of other currencies. 
We estimate the VAR consisting of six variables, order monetary policy shock first, 
then the first principal components of flows and prices for domestic bonds, the first 
principal components of flows and prices for foreign bonds, and finally the NEER. 
The setup and the shock is the same as those in the three-variable VAR model. In 
Figure 2-25, we show the dynamic effect of monetary policy shock on domestic 
flows, domestic price, foreign flows, foreign price, and NEER, while Figure 2-26 
shows the impulse response of the VAR for all variables. 
From Figure 2-25, we can see that the response of domestic bond flows to the 
tightening monetary policy is negative and significant while the reaction of foreign 
bond flows is ambiguous and not significant. The price in both foreign and domestic 
bonds is falling initially as we expected. NEER appreciates in line with the rate rise. 
We do not observe an exchange rate puzzle.   
 
As we can see, the model predicts that monetary tightening is likely to set off 
outflow because the demand for risky assets, corporate bonds and other bonds is 
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reduced due to increases in their risk premium (i.e. a fall in price leads to increases 
in risk premium). This is consistent with the model outcome and considering the 
zero lower bound.  
As Joyce et al. (2011) reported during zero lower bound as part of monetary 
transmission portfolio rebalancing, investors sell gilts, which are government 
bonds, to the Bank of England. Corporate bonds, other assets and equity are a close 
substitute for holding money, which puts upward pressure on the price of corporate, 
foreign assets. However, in our scenario as we unwind (tightening) monetary policy 
then we should expect outflow and a fall in prices of bonds.   
The ambiguity in foreign bond demand needs to be investigated using sign 
restriction in the robustness check (part 2.6), but the result confirms our current 
finding. The mean foreign bond flows show a negative response in line with 
domestic bonds, but the response is not as significant. 
Furthermore, because of tightening monetary policy, we can see an immediate 
appreciation in the NEER as expected and a future depreciation in line with 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP).  
 
Figure 2-25: Instantaneous Response to Monetary Surprise, in UK Domestic 
and Foreign Bonds.  
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Conclusions from Figures 2- 26 show that the overall response is intuitive and we 
can summarise the following from it. 
• A shock to the domestic bond price (Column 3, Row 3) will encourage more 
flows into domestic bond markets and this leads to an appreciation of the pound 
sterling relative to its trading partners.  
• An increase in foreign bond price (Column 5, Row 5) leads to an immediate 
depreciation of the pound sterling and increases inflow to foreign bonds. However, 
over time the pound starts to appreciate, which leads to increases in price and more 
inflow to the domestic economy. This is not statistically significant.   
• A positive shock to the exchange rate increases the domestic price, making 
domestic bonds less attractive than foreign bonds. We can see outflow from 
domestic bonds and increases in foreign bond flows. The price for domestic bonds 
increases and the foreign bond price is falling, but the decline is not significant. 
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Figure 2-26: Instantaneous Response to Monetary Surprise, in UK Domestic 
and Foreign Bonds. 
The  impact of monetary  surprise illustrated  by instantaneous  impulse response  in six-variable 
VAR identified by a Cholesky ordering with the monetary surprise first, domestic flow second, 
domestic  return third,  foreign  flow  fourth , foreign   price fifth and NEER last. The 84 percentile 
bands are shown. 
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2.5.2 The Bond Market and the Equity 
Market in an Open Economy 
 
Traditionally, equity markets and bond markets move in opposite directions i.e. 
when economic risk is low equity is more attractive, whereas bonds are the 
preferred choice during periods of high risk (NLD Bank, 2015). This is clear in our 
basic data analysis in Figure 2-6. We set up a six-variable VAR, which consists of 
monetary policy surprise, first principal component flows and prices in the bond 
market (corporate, others and global), first principal component of equity market 
flows and prices and the log difference of NEER.  
It is evident from Figure 2-27 that tightening monetary policy will decrease bond 
market flows and decrease prices, and have a positive impact on the equity market; 
we can see a drop in price in the equity market as well. These results are in line with 
a recent study by Banegas et al. (2016) into the US data. They look at the impact of 
monetary policy tightening on bond and equity markets in mutual funds and 
conclude that a rise in rate will cause outflows from bonds and inflows into equity 
markets. Furthermore, the fall in the price of equity is consistent with literature that 
monetary policy tightening will decrease equity prices - see Michael Ehrmann and 
Marcel Fratzscher (2004), Bernanke (2003) and Laeven and Tong (2010). 
Furthermore, a shock to both flows and prices in the bond market increases equity 
prices and reduces equity flows. In contrast, a shock to equity flows and prices will 
cause an outflow from the bond market and falling prices for the first 3 months. The 
increases in the NEER show that the price of equity increases and this leads to a 
boost in equity flows and a reduction in bond flows and increases in prices. 
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Figure 2-27: Instantaneous Response to Monetary Surprise in the Bonds and Equity 
Markets. 
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2.6 Robustness checks 
 
We redo the main result using wider categories of bonds and daily frequency data 
from November 2013 to September 2016, as a response to the issue of using 
monthly frequency.  We are estimating bivariate VAR (part 2.4.1.) and then 
trivariate VAR (2.4.3) using daily data and looking at the impact of monetary policy 
in the bond market. We also scrutinise the open economy results by employing sign 
restriction VAR and look at the impact of monetary policy on domestic and foreign 
bonds.  The source of daily data is Thomson Reuter Eikon's global flow. 
2.6.1 Bivariate VAR Result from Daily Data 
 
To see the discrepancy between our estimation in bivariate VAR and that of Feroli 
et al. (2014), we use a wider category of bond, daily frequency and estimated 
bivariate VAR from November 2013 to September 2016. The setup for the VAR is 
the same as it was for monthly data. We set 4-day lags rather than the 4-month lags 
in the monthly data, and Cholesky decomposition was used for identification as 
well as a 90 days accumulation of past fund flows, normalised by the asset control 
indicator that proxies for sustained fund accumulation. The impulse response is 
shown over 18 days rather than 18 months. Two selected categories, corporate and 
global bond outcomes for the daily study, are presented below in Figures 2-28 and 
2-29. As these figures demonstrate, using daily data with more comprehensive bond 
data categories, we do not see any feedback effect in our analysis.  
The full daily impulse response figures for all categories in the bond and equity 
markets can be found in appendix F. 
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Figure 2-28: Corporates bonds 
 
Figure 2-29: Global bonds 
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2.6.2 Trivariate VAR, Result from the Daily 
Data 
 
We also check a three-variable VAR that looks at the impact of monetary policy, 
using data from Bloomberg. In this exercise we are using daily frequency from 
November 2013 to September 2016 with wider categories of bonds, which include 
Emerging Markets Global LC, Bond GBP, Corporates, GB High Yield, Global and 
Global High Yield.  
 
Daily result  
The setup is the same as in the main analysis trivariate VAR in part 2.4.3. However 
in this scenario we are using daily data. Therefore we measure monetary policy 
surprise as follows: we estimate the daily monetary policy surprise by filtering a 
daily monetary shock against the policy announcement date (i.e., in a day with 
policy we take the shock; otherwise we put zero). This daily monetary policy along 
with first principal components of flow and prices will create a system of trivariate 
VAR, as in the main part. 
In Figure 2-30, the impact of monetary policy on flow and prices for both models 
is presented. The monthly main estimation impulse response (benchmark model) 
top row in Figure 2-23 is similar to the daily data lower row.  
In particular, because of tightening monetary policy we can see an outflow and a 
fall in price in the bond market. Using comprehensive bond categories, the high 
frequency shorter time span confirms our original results. In addition, the initial 
negative response in prices is intuitively correct: as the yield rises in line with 
monetary policy the price should fall. This confirms that monetary policy 
transmission channels work as the model predicted: monetary policy can cause 
outflows and a price decrease.  
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The overall picture of the daily response is in Figure 2-31.  This is the equivalent to 
Figure 2-23, however, the magnitude and statistical significance is slightly 
different. This could be because we are using a different dataset. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-30: Response to Monetary Surprise, three model comparison 
The impact of monetary policy on flow and price for IMA data (2005m1 to 2015M12) and daily 
(01/11/13-30/09/16). 
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Figure 2-31: Response to Monetary Surprise:  Daily data (01/11/13-30/09/16) 
The impact of monetary surprise illustrated by Instantaneous impulse response in three-variable 
VAR identified by a Cholesky ordering with the monetary surprise first, flow second and return 
third. The 84 percentile bands are shown.  
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2.6.3 Sign restriction results 
 
 
 
We further test the impact of monetary policy in an open economy. In this we are 
checking the impact of monetary policy on domestic and foreign bonds by imposing 
sign restriction following Mumtaz et al. (2009).  (+) indicates a positive, (-) shows 
a negative impact and (x) is a free estimate in the foreign block. 
In this model, we try to find how domestic flow and foreign bonds will respond to 
the monetary policy shock. In this we only restrict monetary policy, price of 
domestic bonds and NEER. We are uncertain about domestic bond flows, foreign 
bonds flow, and price. Thus, we did not restrict them. This test is shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Restriction:  
 MP Flow D. Price. D Flow F. Price F. NEER 
MP shock      +      x      -      x       x  + 
 
Therefore, a monetary surprise shock (+) is associated with falling bond prices (-) 
and increases in the nominal-effective exchange rate (+). The impact on domestic 
• MP =   Monetary surprise 
• Flow. D=   Flows domestic bond 
• Price. D=  Price Domestic bond 
• Flow. F=   Flows foreign bond 
• Price. F=   Price  Foreign bond 
• NEER = Nominal effective exchange 
rate  
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bond flows, foreign bonds flows, and prices will be determined in the model (x). 
Figure 2-32 shows the outcome of impulse response.  
Imposing sign restriction shows that a surprise tightening of monetary policy leads 
to an immediate and statistically significant decrease in domestic bond flows. This 
confirms that bond flows decrease and price falls are in line with expectations as 
the investor may rush to redeem funds to avoid portfolio losses due to unexpected 
increases in interest rates (ICI, 2016).  
Foreign bond flows on average are decreasing but statistically less significantly and 
there is a wide uncertainty around it. If we consider that as a result of domestic 
monetary policy shock people will switch to global bonds, then one explanation of 
this could that the initial fall in price in the bond market makes investors worry 
about portfolio loss and start redeeming from the fund. This, combined with the 
appreciation of the pound sterling, makes sterling denominated assets less attractive 
to new international investors. Although the price increases over time and probably 
attracts new investors, due to uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) falls in the 
expected exchange rate, current investors shift to global bonds to diversify their 
portfolio and prevent losses. 
Overall the results confirm our earlier results in section 2.5.1, The Bond Market in 
an Open Economy, and in particular figure 2-25.  This is also in line with 
expectations of first mover advantage and confirms the key model implication of 
Feroli et al. (2014) and the results of Cohen and Shin (2002). In this, a monetary 
policy shock can drive flows and flows can drive prices, which supports the 
transmission channels.  
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Figure 2-32: Instantaneous Response to Monetary Surprise using Sign 
Restriction * 
*Note: Restriction imposed just on Price domestic (-) and NEER (+) while Flows domestic, Flow 
foreign and Price foreign in the model is unrestricted. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we investigated the feedback effect in the bond and equity markets 
following Feroli et al. (2014), using IMA data for the UK. We used bivariate VAR 
and tested the first hypothesis of the model in which there is positive feedback 
between fund flows and price. We only observed the response of flows to prices, 
and only four sectors in the equity market showed a very weak positive feedback 
effect. We were unable to observe a full feedback effect in the bond market in our 
dataset. In other words, we do not observe any response in prices because of a shock 
in flows. We tested the same model using daily rather than monthly data. The result 
did not change, and the daily data confirms the outcome for the monthly set. 
Therefore, we are unable to confirm the first hypothesis of the model. 
Next, we measured monetary policy surprise using Wright's methodology (2012) 
using high-frequency data to assess the impact of monetary policy on flows and 
price, which is the second model implication. In the three variable model VAR a 
surprise tightening of monetary policy leads to outflows and a fall in prices. This is 
a confirmation of the second hypothesis and in line with Feroli et al. (2014). We 
could see the transmission channels as the model predicted, with monetary policy 
influencing both flows and prices. In the same framework, our results showed that 
flows respond positively to price shock which is in line with literature such as 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Feroli et al. (2014). This 
shows that price is an incentive for the majority of the fund inflows. However, 
prices respond negatively initially to flow shocks, which is in direct contrast to the 
positive response found in the US data by Feroli et al. (2014). 
Further, we scrutinise our result by testing with a different data set and wider 
categories of bonds. We used a daily frequency but a shorter time span and the result 
holds.  
We demonstrated how investors would respond by shifting their balances from 
domestic to foreign bonds, or vice versa. Due to tightening monetary policy, we can 
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see outflow from domestic bonds while the foreign bonds response is ambiguous.  
We also checked our result using sign restriction: the result did not change in 
domestic bonds while foreign bond flows became less significant and were falling. 
The result for domestic bonds is line with the model prediction and Joyce et al. 
(2011).  
We further established how investors in the UK allocate their assets between 
equities and bonds due to monetary policy shock. As result of monetary policy 
shock, we can see outflows from bonds into equities while the prices in both assets 
are falling in line with expectations. The switch between bonds and equities due to 
monetary policy is in line with a recent study by Banegas et al. (2016) at the Federal 
Reserve. This may be a sign of first mover advantage in the bond market predicted 
by Feroli et al. (2014). 
Falls in equity prices are consistent with Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher 
(2004), Bernanke (2003) and Laeven and Tong (2010). They found that as a result 
of tightening monetary policy, equity price falls. 
This chapter contributes to the policy debate on the risk of financial instability 
coming from asset management and possible contagion of the real sector. For 
example, on 6 February 2018 market participants expected interest rates to rise and 
shifted their assets from equities to bonds and other assets. This wiped about 4 
trillion US dollars from the world’s stock markets within a week (Reuters 6 Feb 
2018). This is in line with one of the predictions of the extension of the model that 
investors may switch to bonds when the interest rate goes up.  Asset management 
has become an important player in the financial sector, triggering a structural shift 
that moves risk from banks to asset management. 
Unlike the banking sector, which is regulated and scrutinised due to its role in the 
recent financial crisis, asset management is unregulated. The lack of regulation and 
risk of financial instability make regulators anxious, putting the topic at the heart of 
the policy debate.  
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Appendix A: Example of PDF file for data collection. 
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Appendix B:  Summary statistics 
Table 1: funds under management for each category in equity and bond markets (figure in £billion) 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std.  Dev.  Observations 
Asia Pacific Excluding Japan  20.9 23.3 30.5 8.1 6.6 131.0 
Asia Pacific Including Japan  1.4 1.4 2.1 0.7 0.4 131.0 
Europe Excluding UK  33.4 32.4 50.3 20.8 6.5 131.0 
Europe Including UK  2.5 2.3 4.1 1.4 0.7 131.0 
European Smaller Companies  3.0 2.8 5.7 1.3 1.0 131.0 
Global Emerging Markets  10.9 10.0 20.1 3.4 5.0 131.0 
Japan  8.5 7.8 14.6 5.6 2.2 131.0 
Japanese Smaller Companies  0.4 0.3 1.1 0.2 0.2 131.0 
North America  21.1 19.5 38.0 11.8 7.8 131.0 
North American Smaller Companies  1.1 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.3 131.0 
Specialist  21.6 21.8 39.5 6.9 8.4 131.0 
Technology and Telecommunications  0.8 0.8 1.3 0.5 0.2 131.0 
UK All Companies  111.9 105.4 173.1 67.1 26.7 131.0 
UK Equity Income  49.2 53.0 73.3 20.5 13.0 131.0 
UK Smaller Companies  8.4 8.2 12.6 4.0 2.2 131.0 
Other Equity 51.4 50.2 98.7 17.0 24.7 131.0 
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Total Equity  346.6 326.3 543.7 198.5 93.7 131.0 
Corporate Bond  44.4 46.3 60.8 24.7 10.9 131.0 
Global Bonds  9.6 10.4 18.3 2.8 4.6 131.0 
UK Gilts  15.4 16.3 22.6 4.0 5.1 131.0 
UK Index Linked Gilts  3.3 3.5 5.0 1.0 1.0 131.0 
Other Fixed Income 26.4 25.9 45.6 10.3 11.9 131.0 
Total Fixed Income  99.2 101.1 143.1 42.9 30.3 131.0 
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Table 2: correlation between flows in equity categories and bond markets categorise before crisis (2005m2-2007M2) 
 
LFL1 LFL2 LFL3 LFL4 LFL5 LFL6 LFL7 LFL8 LFL9 LFL10 LFL11 LFL12 LFL13 LFL14 LFL15 LFL16 LFL17 LFL18 LFL19 LFL20 LFL21 LFL22 LFL23 
LFL1 1.00                                             
LFL2 0.07 1.00                                           
LFL3 0.25 -0.11 1.00                                         
LFL4 0.50 0.19 0.28 1.00                                       
LFL5 0.70 0.14 0.50 0.49 1.00                                     
LFL6 0.05 -0.06 -0.30 0.02 0.04 1.00                                   
LFL7 0.47 0.07 0.06 0.50 0.28 0.11 1.00                                 
LFL8 -0.07 -0.04 0.29 0.10 0.15 -0.03 0.09 1.00                               
LFL9 0.22 -0.07 0.50 0.10 0.11 -0.38 0.26 -0.04 1.00                             
LFL10 0.16 0.46 -0.09 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.23 -0.39 0.04 1.00                           
LFL11 -0.03 -0.27 0.28 0.01 -0.16 -0.12 0.02 0.12 0.27 -0.08 1.00                         
LFL12 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.25 -0.03 -0.27 0.30 -0.04 0.36 0.20 0.53 1.00                       
LFL13 0.24 0.05 0.35 0.19 0.31 0.03 -0.14 0.09 0.23 0.08 -0.24 0.02 1.00                     
LFL14 0.35 -0.06 0.57 -0.07 0.38 -0.12 -0.22 0.29 0.17 -0.36 0.22 -0.10 0.17 1.00                   
LFL15 0.01 -0.15 0.63 0.00 0.28 -0.27 -0.05 0.39 0.39 -0.01 0.14 0.01 0.48 0.35 1.00                 
LFL16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.10 0.16 -0.14 -0.18 -0.13 0.26 0.10 -0.26 -0.05 0.56 0.09 0.03 1.00               
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LFL17 0.48 -0.04 0.67 0.36 0.51 -0.07 0.09 0.18 0.50 0.04 0.15 0.27 0.82 0.43 0.52 0.56 1.00             
LFL18 -0.06 0.42 0.04 0.27 0.13 0.01 0.33 0.19 -0.15 0.23 -0.24 0.34 0.03 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 1.00           
LFL19 0.14 -0.16 -0.43 0.09 -0.25 -0.05 0.18 -0.18 -0.06 0.15 -0.25 -0.06 0.03 -0.36 -0.29 0.24 -0.07 -0.28 1.00         
LFL20 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.19 -0.24 0.28 -0.02 -0.28 -0.03 0.25 -0.08 0.15 0.25 -0.02 -0.09 0.38 0.22 -0.05 0.38 1.00       
LFL21 -0.27 0.06 -0.17 -0.30 -0.12 -0.03 -0.38 0.17 0.09 -0.07 -0.17 -0.34 -0.04 -0.13 0.14 0.16 -0.13 -0.31 -0.01 -0.23 1.00     
LFL22 -0.26 -0.24 0.19 -0.21 0.08 -0.23 -0.26 0.27 -0.01 -0.37 0.12 -0.15 -0.07 0.23 0.26 -0.23 -0.03 -0.01 -0.27 -0.39 0.19 1.00   
LFL23 -0.18 0.23 -0.15 0.21 -0.13 0.04 0.14 0.09 -0.16 0.23 -0.36 0.20 0.15 -0.23 -0.12 0.18 0.03 0.64 0.30 0.46 -0.06 0.14 1 
 
Equity Market: LF1: Asia Pacific Excluding Japan,  LF2 Asia Pacific Including Japan, LF3 Europe Excluding UK, LF4  Europe Including UK, LF5 European Smaller Companies LF6 
Global Emerging Markets, LF7  Japan, LF8 Japanese Smaller Companies, LF9 North America, LF10 North American Smaller Companies LF11 Specialist, LF12 Technology and 
Telecommunications, LF13 UK All Companies, LF14 UK Equity Income, Lf15 UK Smaller Companies, Lf16 Other ,LF17 Total equity       
Bond Market: Lf18 £ Corporate Bond, Lf19 Global Bonds, LF20 UK Gilts, LF21 UK Index Linked Gilts, Lf22 Other Fixed Income LF23Total Bond 
Table 3: correlation between flows in equity categories and bond market categories post crisis (2007m2-2015M12)  
 
LFL1 LFL2 LFL3 LFL4 LFL5 LFL6 LFL7 LFL8 LFL9 LFL10 LFL11 LFL12 LFL13 LFL14 LFL15 LFL16 LFL17 LFL18 LFL19 LFL20 LFL21 LFL22 LFL23 
LFL1 1.00                                             
LFL2 0.12 1.00                                           
LFL3 -0.27 -0.08 1.00                                         
LFL4 0.06 0.07 0.01 1.00                                       
LFL5 -0.07 0.02 0.47 0.22 1.00                                     
LFL6 0.41 0.20 -0.08 0.06 0.15 1.00                                   
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LFL7 -0.37 0.07 0.36 0.06 0.19 -0.17 1.00                                 
LFL8 -0.13 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.26 1.00                               
LFL9 -0.01 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.12 1.00                             
LFL10 0.06 0.20 -0.04 -0.08 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.26 1.00                           
LFL11 0.09 0.11 0.11 -0.07 0.16 0.14 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 0.22 1.00                         
LFL12 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.16 0.05 1.00                       
LFL13 -0.01 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.15 -0.17 -0.01 -0.16 0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 1.00                     
LFL14 -0.14 -0.25 0.23 -0.15 0.02 -0.12 0.06 -0.28 -0.13 -0.18 0.22 -0.17 0.02 1.00                   
LFL15 -0.09 0.15 0.31 0.19 0.42 0.13 0.22 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.18 0.20 0.24 -0.13 1.00                 
LFL16 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.26 -0.04 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.28 -0.04 0.33 1.00               
LFL17 0.11 0.13 0.54 0.23 0.41 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.34 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.60 0.10 0.48 0.40 1.00             
LFL18 0.37 0.13 -0.31 0.01 -0.16 -0.11 -0.27 -0.13 0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.05 -0.10 1.00           
LFL19 0.37 0.35 -0.13 0.12 0.23 0.33 -0.18 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.21 0.11 -0.05 0.08 0.29 1.00         
LFL20 -0.09 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.03 -0.11 0.10 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.02 1.00       
LFL21 0.11 -0.03 -0.18 0.05 -0.22 -0.03 -0.21 -0.15 -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.11 0.04 0.14 -0.15 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 1.00     
LFL22 0.29 0.16 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.23 0.05 -0.18 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.15 -0.10 0.03 1.00   
LFL23 0.32 0.28 -0.25 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.24 -0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.74 0.44 0.27 0.11 0.40 1 
 
Equity Market: LF1: Asia Pacific Excluding Japan,  LF2 Asia Pacific Including Japan, LF3 Europe Excluding UK, LF4  Europe Including UK, LF5 European Smaller Companies LF6 
Global Emerging Markets, LF7  Japan, LF8 Japanese Smaller Companies, LF9 North America, LF10 North American Smaller Companies LF11 Specialist, LF12 Technology and 
Telecommunications, LF13 UK All Companies, LF14 UK Equity Income, Lf15 UK Smaller Companies, Lf16 Other ,LF17 Total equity   Bond Market: Lf18 £ Corporate Bond, Lf19 
Global Bonds, LF20 UK Gilts, LF21 UK Index Linked Gilts, Lf22 Other Fixed Income LF23Total Bond. 
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Appendix C: Bivariate VAR impulse Figure monthly data 
Impulse response from equity monthly data, Cholesky identification that do not show 
feedback effect  
 
 
Figure 1: Asia Pacific Including Japan  
 
 
Figure 2: Europe Excluding UK 
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Figure 3: Europe Including UK 
 
 
Figure 4: Global Emerging Markets 
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Figure 5: Japan 
 
Figure 6: Japanese Smaller Companies 
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Figure 7: North America 
 
Figure 8:  North American Smaller Companies 
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718
Flow to Flow 
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718
Flow to MKt Chg
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
MKt Chg to Flow
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
MKt Chg to MKt Chg
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718
Flow to Flow 
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718
Flow to MKt Chg
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
MKt Chg to Flow
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17
MKt Chg to MKt Chg
138 
 
 
Figure 9: Technology and Telecommunications 
 
 
Figure 10: UK All Companies 
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Figure 11: UK Equity Income 
 
Figure 12: UK Smaller Companies 
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Figure 13: Other Equity 
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Appendix D: Summary statistics coefficient and standard error from Bivariate VAR results 
 FL
(-
1
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
FL
(-
2
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
FL
(-
3
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
FL
(-
4
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
M
K
(-
1
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
M
K
(-
2
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
M
K
(-
3
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
 M
K
(-
4
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
C
 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
@
M
SU
M
(L
FL
1
(-
1
),
1
2
)/
FN
1
(-
1
3
) 
St
.e
rr
o
rs
 
 R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
 
 A
d
j. 
R
-s
q
u
ar
ed
 
FL1 0.37 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.08 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.41 0.36 
MK1 1.10 -0.91 0.52 -0.97 -0.66 -0.97 0.33 -0.86 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 0.03 -0.11  0.17 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.15 -0.15 0.05 -0.03 
FL2 0.27 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02  0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.29 0.23 
MK2 0.25 -0.42 -0.51 -0.44 0.64 -0.44 -0.26 -0.40 0.11 -0.10 -0.23 -0.10 0.22 -0.11  -0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 0.10 0.02 
FL3 0.32 -0.10 0.16 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.44 0.40 
MK3 0.40 -1.00 -0.25 -1.03 0.98 -1.05 -1.21 -0.99 0.06 -0.10 -0.22 -0.10 0.06 -0.10  0.12 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 0.11 0.04 
FL4 0.29 -0.10 0.08 -0.11 0.14 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.04  0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.23 0.16 
MK4 -0.04 -0.31 -0.14 -0.32 -0.34 -0.32 0.55 -0.31 -0.19 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11 0.03 -0.11  0.14 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.10 0.02 
FL5 0.35 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.16 -0.08 0.19 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.03  0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.54 0.50 
MK5 0.89 -0.41 0.16 -0.43 -0.52 -0.44 0.32 -0.36 0.07 -0.10 -0.22 -0.12 -0.02 -0.12  0.04 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.08 0.00 
FL6 0.36 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.24 0.18 
MK6 0.18 -0.68 0.03 -0.65 0.41 -0.63 -0.47 -0.62 0.02 -0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.06 -0.10  0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 
FL7 0.21 -0.10 0.11 -0.10 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.29 0.23 
MK7 0.18 -0.42 0.52 -0.43 -0.28 -0.44 -0.60 -0.42 0.14 -0.10 -0.23 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10  0.03 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 0.13 0.06 
FL8 0.30 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.04  0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.26 
MK8 -0.11 -0.29 -0.29 -0.31 -0.26 -0.31 -0.22 -0.29 -0.29 -0.10 -0.18 -0.11 -0.24 -0.11  -0.05 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.06 
FL9 0.31 -0.10 0.10 -0.10 0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.19 0.13 
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MK9 -0.46 -0.55 -0.10 -0.56 -0.72 -0.57 0.69 -0.55 -0.12 -0.10 -0.16 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10  0.17 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.10 0.11 0.03 
FL10 0.38 -0.09 0.18 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.27 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.02  0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.47 0.43 
MK10 -0.89 -0.50 0.47 -0.53 -0.41 -0.52 -0.36 -0.50 -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.11  0.15 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.10 0.03 
FL11 0.59 -0.10 -0.22 -0.11 0.23 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02  -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.69 0.67 
MK11 0.18 -0.64 0.10 -0.69 0.33 -0.68 -0.48 -0.51 0.22 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 0.07 -0.11  0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.00 
FL12 0.29 -0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.20 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 0.13 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.02  -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.48 0.43 
MK12 0.29 -0.47 -0.25 -0.47 -0.29 -0.48 -0.06 -0.44 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12  -0.08 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.05 -0.03 
FL13 0.18 -0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.12 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01  0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.02 
MK13 1.59 -0.93 0.31 -0.96 0.00 -0.96 1.57 -0.89 -0.17 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.08 -0.10  0.20 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.26 -0.24 0.11 0.03 
FL14 0.36 -0.10 0.22 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.10 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.42 0.37 
MK14 -0.09 -0.99 1.23 -1.06 -0.78 -1.07 2.91 -1.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.02 -0.09  0.16 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.33 -0.14 0.13 0.05 
FL15 0.43 -0.10 0.27 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02  0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.56 0.52 
MK15 1.37 -0.66 -0.93 -0.74 -0.35 -0.76 0.73 -0.66 0.16 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 0.16 -0.11  0.06 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.02 
FL16 0.12 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.16 0.08 
MK16 -1.20 -1.09 1.32 -1.07 0.41 -1.06 -0.72 -0.95 0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.10  0.13 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.17 0.06 -0.01 
FL17 0.26 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.14 -0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.24 0.18 
MK17 1.33 -1.37 0.94 -1.42 0.42 -1.42 2.01 -1.30 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 0.00 -0.10  0.19 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.26 0.09 0.02 
FL18 0.52 -0.10 0.31 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 0.18 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04  -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.54 0.50 
MK18 -0.34 -0.32 -0.14 -0.35 0.69 -0.35 0.06 -0.33 -0.11 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.07 -0.11  -0.08 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 
FL19 0.54 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 0.13 -0.10 0.08 -0.10 0.17 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.09 -0.04  -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.40 0.35 
MK19 -0.09 -0.25 -0.29 -0.27 -0.50 -0.27 -0.06 -0.26 -0.28 -0.10 -0.26 -0.11 -0.21 -0.10  -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.15 0.08 
FL20 0.13 -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03  0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.20 0.14 
MK20 -0.54 -0.33 -0.30 -0.33 -0.30 -0.33 -0.19 -0.33 -0.64 -0.10 -0.29 -0.11 -0.18 -0.11  -0.17 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.07 0.31 0.25 
FL21 0.12 -0.10 0.05 -0.11 0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 0.27 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.02 -0.05  0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.32 0.27 
MK21 -0.46 -0.27 0.09 -0.27 0.03 -0.27 -0.20 -0.24 -0.30 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15 -0.12  -0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.05 
143 
 
FL22 0.33 -0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.17 -0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02  -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.49 0.45 
MK22 -0.50 -0.49 0.06 -0.51 1.03 -0.49 -0.10 -0.46 -0.07 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.11  -0.06 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 
FL23 0.38 -0.10 0.28 -0.11 -0.02 -0.11 -0.22 -0.10 0.15 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.47 0.43 
MK23 0.14 -0.36 0.41 -0.39 -0.03 -0.40 0.14 -0.37 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12  0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.05 -0.03 
 
Equity Market: FL1 & MK1: Asia Pacific Excluding Japan,  LF2&MK1 Asia Pacific Including Japan, FL3&MK3  Europe Excluding UK, FL4 &MK4 Europe Including UK, FL5&MK5 
European Smaller Companies FL6&Mk6  Global Emerging Markets, FL7&Mk7 Japan, FL8&MK8 Japanese Smaller Companies, FL9&Mk9  North America, FL10&MK10 North American 
Smaller Companies FL11&MK11 Specialist, FL12&MK12 Technology and Telecommunications, FL13&MK13 UK All Companies, FL14&Mk14 UK Equity Income, FL15&MK14 UK Smaller 
Companies, FL16&MK16 Other ,FL17&MK17 Total equity       
Bond Market: FL18&MK18 £ Corporate Bond, FL19&MK19  Global Bonds, FL20&MK20 UK Gilts, FL21&Mk21 UK Index Linked Gilts, Fl22&MK22Other Fixed Income LF23Total Bond
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 Appendix E:  Wright methodology measure of monetary surprise 
 
Measuring the monetary policy stance using Wright methodology could be as 
follows: It is based on the heteroskedasticity estimation of Roberto Rigobon (2003). 
We are going to use daily frequency data and will estimate VAR as follows to create 
monetary policy surprise.   
We estimate the following reduced VAR: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡     
Because we know that it is reduced from the forecast error which can be related to 
a set of underlying shocks such as:  
𝑢𝑡 is the reduced form forecast error that can be related to a set of underlying shocks 
as:  
𝑢𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝜂𝑖𝑡       
Where 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is the ith structural shock, 𝑅𝑖 is a px1 vector, and the structural shocks 
are independent of each other over time. We are ordering monetary policy first, 
however, it is not necessary as we are not going to use the Cholesky decomposition 
for identification.  
Variance and covariance of the reduced form of all shocks on announcement day 
and non- announcement days are presented in the following matrices. As the 
monetary policy shock is located in the first column of the below matrices, the 
variance of monetary policy shock will be  𝜎1
2 ; otherwise variance will be  𝜎0
2 , the 
mean will be zero in both situations.  
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As can be seen, all other structural shocks except monetary shock are identically 
distributed with mean zero and variance one. The identifying assumption is that 
𝜎1
2 ≠ 𝜎0
2  This strategy for identification was proposed by Rigobon (2003) and 
applied to asset price data by Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004 and 2005).  
We will have the following condition: 
                                      
This allows 𝑅1 to be identified. As  𝑅1𝑅1
′  and  𝜎1
2 − 𝜎0
2  are not separately identified, 
we assume that 𝜎1
2 − 𝜎0
2  =1.  Also, as we are looking to find the monetary policy 
shock, there is no need for further restriction on the VAR system.  
We estimate reduced form VAR coefficient matrices F and also residual𝑢𝑡. Then 
based on the announcement and non-announcement, we split the residual into two 
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groups and construct sample variance and covariance of each group. We will denote 
the estimate-sample variance and covariance as ∑̂1 and ∑̂0. We can estimate 
parameter 𝑅1  by solving the minimum distance problem. 
 
Where ?̂?0 and ?̂?1   are estimates of the variance and covariance matrices of  
𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(∑̂1)  and 𝑣𝑒𝑐ℎ(∑̂0)   
After identifying ?̂?1, we can measure monetary surprise as follows:  
We can rewrite the reduced form of the VAR to the structural form as follows A
 then we know that  , and then we can estimate   
In this equation we just need the first column of A which is 𝑅1  . Therefore, we can 
measure the structural shock for monetary policy for each point in the time series. 
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Appendix F: Bivariate VAR impulse Figure daily data  
 
Bivariate VAR impulse response from daily data, equity and bond markets Cholesky 
identification  
 
Figure 1: Emerging Markets Global HC 
 
 
Figure 2 Emerging Markets Global LC 
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Figure 3 GBP 
 
 
Figure 4. GBP Government 
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Figure 5. GBP High Yield 
 
 
Figure 6 GBP Inflation Linked 
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Figure 7.GBP Short Term 
 
 
Figure 8. Global High Yield 
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Figure 9. Equity Emerging Mkts Global 
 
 
Figure 10. Equity Europe ex UK 
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Figure 11. Equity Global ex UK 
 
 
Figure 12. Equity UK 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The impact of external economic 
shocks to the UK economy 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
The UK economy is closely integrated into the world economy through trade and 
financial services. Understanding the transmission of international shocks to the 
UK and the magnitude of those shocks informs the domestic policy response. 
Building on the growing literature on the importance of large data sets for empirical 
macroeconomic modelling, we use a large data set to analyse the impact of global 
developments on the UK economy. We evaluate the impact of shocks originating 
from advanced economies (G7) and emerging markets (EM) on UK 
macroeconomic variables. These two groups of countries produce 70 per cent of 
world output. We distinguish between a supply shock and oil price shocks, and the 
analysis will be based on reduced form VAR (FAVAR). The outcome of this simple 
and transparent model will be compared to the multi country large scale model 
NiGEM. 
The impact of changes in advanced economies on the UK may be different 
compared to that of emerging economies as they have different links to the UK and 
different economic structures. As we can see from Figures 3-1 and 3-2, while UK 
trade in merchandise goods with advanced economies is steadily declining, with 
emerging markets it is growing. 
Furthermore, the FDI as proxy for financial connections has the same trend as 
shown in Figures 3-3 and 3-4. The trend for outward FDI for both of these groups 
of countries reached the same level after the recent financial crisis. This could be 
due to excessive risks, low returns and severe economic recession in advanced 
economies. 
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Figure 3-1:UK merchandise exports to advanced economies and emerging 
economies as a share of world UK exports, annual 1995-2013 
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/ 
  
Figure 3-2:UK merchandise imports from advanced economies and emerging 
economies as a share of world UK exports, annual 1995-2013 
Source: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/ 
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Figure 3-3: Outward FDI in advanced and emerging economies as a share of 
total outward FDI UK 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/ 
 
  
Figure 3-4: Inward FDI from advanced and emerging economies as a share 
of total 
Inward FDI UK. Source: http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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The UK received nearly 50 per cent of its FDI from its partners in the G7 while its 
outward FDI to the G7 and the EM has recently converged to the same level. These 
pictures confirm the role of emerging economies, and the necessity of 
understanding the potential for emerging economies to affect the domestic economy 
alongside traditional trading partners.  
Furthermore, the potential impact of oil price shocks has increased for the UK, as 
it became a major oil producer in 1975 and a net oil exporter from 1981 to 2005. 
International supply and oil price shocks could have different impacts on the UK 
due to oil revenue. Also, separation between supply and oil price shocks may 
prevent misspecification of the model. The figures below show the oil price and the 
UK profile of oil production and consumption since 1975. UK oil production has 
increased since 1975 while the oil consumption has stayed the same; therefore the 
oil intensity10 of the UK economy has fallen, as it has for other advanced economies. 
 
Figure 3-5: Oil production, consumption and exports in the UK  
Source: BP statistics  
                                                          
10 We define oil intensity as the share of consumption of oil, gas and coal as a share of GDP in 
2009. 
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Figure 3-6: Oil intensity of UK and oil price 
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3.2 Literature review.  
 
An open economy like the UK is subject to external shocks, causing fluctuation in 
domestic variables. The impact depends on how and in what sectors the local 
economy is exposed to world events. In the applied macroeconomic literature VAR 
models, pioneered by Sims (1980), have become the workhorse of the investigation 
of shocks (e.g monetary policy, fiscal policy, supply shock, demand shock etc.). 
The model is popular for its simplicity and transparency. It has been significantly 
extended and is used widely among economic researchers and policymakers. For 
this thesis Bernanke and et al.’s (2005) Factor Augmented VAR approach can be 
used to analyse a large array of variables.  
As an alternative to VAR approaches, policy makers (central bankers and policy 
institutions such as the European Commission and the IMF) also use large scale 
models to investigate the impact of shock or policy changes in one country on other 
countries. These models are quite complicated and most of them are multi-country 
models. Examples include NiGEM of the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, the IMF’s Multimod and QUEST from the European Commission.  
It is therefore interesting to compare these two very different modelling approaches.  
There is a large body of literature that has used VAR (vector autoregression model) 
to investigate the transmission of international shocks – mostly monetary shocks – 
in an open economy. This literature is mostly based on a small scale VAR: see, for 
example, Sims (1980, 1992), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Clardia and Gali 
(1994), Canova and de Nicole (2002), Uhlig (2005) and many others. The model 
has also been applied to study the impact of fiscal policy: see, among many, 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Kim and Roubini (2008), and Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009). The VAR model has been used to study oil price shocks, capital controls 
and exchange rates: Kim (2003, 2014), Millard and Shakir (2013). 
By using a small scale VAR we are losing information. For example, central 
bankers monitor a large number of variables and if they do not incorporate all 
available information in their decision process, they may mis-specify the model. 
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Furthermore, if we use a small scale VAR, the impact of the impulse response will 
be limited to a set of variables. 
To overcome the limitation of small scale VAR, the factor model was introduced 
by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005). This model has been widely used to 
investigate various shocks to the economy. For example, Lagana and Mountford 
(2005) applied the same methodology to investigate the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the UK economy. Mumtaz and Surico (2009) extended the Bernanke, 
Boivin and Eliasz (2005) models to look at the impact of external shocks on the 
open economy (2009).  
This work is closely linked to Mumtaz and Surico (2009). They used their 
framework to examine the impact of foreign shocks on the UK economy. They 
found that shocks to foreign economic activity have little impact on the UK 
economy, although they have not distinguished the source of the foreign shocks. 
The shocks they studied mostly originated in advanced economies. We are 
extending their analysis to include emerging economies.  
We separate supply shocks and oil price shocks. The UK was a net oil exporter from 
1982 to 2005. Oil price and foreign supply shocks were expected to have different 
impacts on the UK. Increases in the oil price boost oil revenue but they also drive 
inflation up. We are extending Mumtaz and Surico's (2009) UK data from 2005 to 
2012 and using a new data set for advanced and emerging economies we are using 
a new data set. This list is available in appendix B. 
Our contribution is to differentiate sources of shock between advanced and 
emerging economies and also separate oil price and supply shocks using a rich data 
set up to 2012. We compare the outcome to a large scale model. We investigate the 
following shocks: demand shocks in advanced and emerging economies, supply 
shock, and oil price shock.  
We use these shocks with sign restriction. Following the contribution of Mumtaz 
and Surico (2009), we ask whether shocks originating from these two groups of 
countries will differ. What would be the impact of oil price shocks on the UK price 
and what would be the impact of a supply shock from these groups of countries 
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over a disaggregated consumer price deflator? The result of these shocks will be 
checked against the large scale quarterly model NiGEM. 
3.3 Methodology 
 
The model is based on Bernanke et al. (2005), expanded by Mumtaz and Surico 
(2009) to include international factors. Following Mumtaz and Surico, the model 
has two blocks, one for foreign (advanced economies, emerging economies and oil 
prices) and the other for the domestic UK economy. The state of the economy 
cannot be observed but we can summarise in the K factor of unobservable factors. 
 𝐹𝑡 = [𝐹𝑡
𝐺7 𝐹𝑡
𝐸𝑀 𝐹𝑡
𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝐹𝑡
𝑈𝐾]′     (3-1) 
Advanced economies, emerging economies and oil prices are part of a foreign 
block; the central bank policy rate will be Rt and directly observable. The joint 
dynamic Ft and Rt will be determined by the following equation:  
 
[
𝐹𝑡
𝑅𝑡
] = 𝐵(𝐿) [
𝐹𝑡−1
𝑅𝑡−1
] + 𝑢𝑡    (3-2) 
 
In this equation B(L), there is a conformable lag polynomial of finite order p, and   
𝑢𝑡 = Ω
1/2𝑒𝑡is an error term with mean zero 𝑒𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝐼) and   Ω = 𝐴0(𝐴0)′ 
Equation (3-2) is a standard VAR model, the only difference being F as unobserved 
factors which are extracted by a large panel of the N indicator which contains 
important information about the economy. Let 𝑋𝑡 be a vector of information 
variables: the factors and the variables in the panel are related by an observation 
equation of form: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜆
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + 𝜆
𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡    (3-3) 
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Where   𝜆𝑓  and 𝜆𝑅 are N by K and N X 1 matrices of factor loading, and  𝑣𝑡is      
a vector of N by 1 zero mean disturbance.  
Equation 3-2 and 3-3 is the FAVAR model from Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz 
(2005) extended to include foreign blocks (Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov, 2009 and 
Mumtaz and Surico, 2009). 𝑋𝑡  Will be driven by the joint dynamic of Ft and Rt. 
The factor can be estimated by principal components (Stock and Watson (2002, 
2005)). Principal components analysis is a mathematical tool that reduces a 
complex data set, possibly correlated, to a lower dimension and uncorrelated data. 
In other words, we try to find or construct a small data set that can describe and 
represent characteristics of a large data set. 
To estimate FAVAR given by equation (3-2), we need the unobserved factors. We 
follow closely Mumtaz and Surico (2009) and assume that the foreign block 
contains five factors, where 𝑦𝑔7and  𝜋𝑔7 represents the real activity factor and 
inflation factors of advanced economies,  𝑦𝑒𝑚 and  𝜋𝑒𝑚 represents emerging 
economies’ real activity and inflation, and  𝑂𝑖𝑙 represents real oil price factors. 
These factors are identified through the upper N by 6 block of matrices that was 
assumed to be a block diagonal. Forexample, advanced economy real activity 
factors come from the real activity of the G7 in our panels. All factors are identified 
accordingly. 
The UK dynamics of UK variables are captured by K domestic factors. The 
domestic factors are extracted from the full panel of the UK series, in other words, 
the bottom N by K block of a full matrix. This will ensure that the dynamic of the 
variable in 𝑋𝑡  depends on the structure imposed on by the factor loading 
parameters.   
 
 
 
163 
 
3.4 Data  
 
We use quarterly data from 1975 to 2012 Q4. The data contains 615 foreign and 
domestic variables. The advanced economies are the G7 (USA, Canada, Germany, 
Italy, France and Japan) and the emerging economies are Brazil, India, China, 
Russia, South Africa, Turkey and Mexico. The following data was collected for 
these countries.   
Real economic activity: Real output, industrial production, exports and imports of 
goods and services, the oil intensity of the economy as a share of output.  
Prices: Consumer price deflator, GDP deflators, import prices, imports of 
commodity and non-commodity prices. 
Interest rate: We assume that the G7 financial market has relevance worldwide, and 
therefore collected a 3-month interbank rate and 10 years of government bond 
yields. 
Oil price: We included the oil price for the Brent and Dubai markets and deflated it 
by the US consumer price to create a real oil price. 
All of this data is seasonally adjusted, and we take log first differences of these 
series and in some cases log the second difference to ensure the data is stationary, 
apart from the interest rate and oil intensity of the economy which we will use as 
the level.  
The UK data includes real activity and expenditure, deflator prices, government 
accounts, the household sector, the labour market, and the financial sector. All of 
this data is transformed to be stationary and standardised prior to estimation. The 
source for UK data is mostly the ONS, the Bank of England and DataStream; the 
international data is mostly taken from their national and international sources, the 
IMF, DataStream and other sources such as NiGEM (NIESR) (most data in NiGEM 
is also taken from these sources and then transformed or extended).  Overall, we 
collected 406 domestic series and 209 foreign series; the full list is in Appendix B. 
 
164 
 
3.5 Estimation 
 
We follow Mumtaz and Surico (2009) and Bernanke et al. (2005) in using two-step 
procedures. In the first step, the unobserved factor and the loading factor will be 
estimated via principal components. In the second step, we use these factors and a 
3-month Treasury bill to estimate VAR via Bayesian methods. Our UK model has 
five factors. This implies that our estimation of VAR will have 12 endogenous 
variables. We include two lags in our estimation.  
 
3.5.1 Identification of structural shocks 
 
We look at the impact of the following shocks originating from advanced and 
emerging economies and oil markets.  
Demand shocks in advanced and emerging economies: These shocks are associated 
with the rise and fall in confidence in these economies. They could be the fiscal 
policy in these economies or events that reduce or increase spending confidence in 
households and firms. As a result, the aggregate demand will shift in these 
economies in our scenario.  
Supply shock: These shocks come from the production sector which will in turn 
impact the supply and prices of goods and services. This could be an increase in 
productivity and a reduction in the price which would shift the aggregate supply 
curve.  
Oil price shock: shocks originating in the supply or production of oil, or instability 
in an oil exporting region (Kilian 2014). 
In all our shocks, we look at the impact of a 1 per cent increase in aggregate demand, 
aggregate supply and real oil prices. As in chapter one we need to impose additional 
restrictions on the model. One possibility would be to add zero restriction following 
Arias et al. (2018), however, this is quite computationally intensive, especially in a 
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VAR of high dimension with several shocks. Thus we leave this for future work 
and we choose a simpler option of imposing extra sign restrictions on the identified 
shocks to ensure each shock has a unique pattern. A drawback of this approach is 
that some of these restrictions involve quite strong assumptions, as we detail below. 
Then we analyse the impact of these shocks on selected domestic variables in the 
UK. 
           [𝐴𝐷𝑔7 𝐴𝑆𝑔7   𝑅𝑔7  𝐴𝐷𝑒𝑚 𝐴𝑆𝑒𝑚  𝑂     𝐹𝑢𝑘    𝑅𝑢𝑘] 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑦𝑔7
𝜋𝑔7
𝑟𝑔7
𝑦𝑒𝑚
𝜋𝑒𝑚
𝑂𝑖𝑙
𝐹𝑢𝑘
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𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑔7
𝑒𝐴𝑆𝑔7
𝑒𝑅𝑔7
𝑒𝐴𝐷𝑒𝑚
𝑒𝐴𝑆𝑒𝑚
𝑒𝑂𝑝
𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑘
𝑒𝑟 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Identification Scheme.  
As we can see from the sign identification restrictions above, we order the 
international factors first, then UK factors and finally observe the factor interest 
rate. (+) indicates a positive, (-) shows a negative impact and (x) is a free estimate 
in the foreign block. 
 We assume that a supply shock in advanced economies has a negative 
impact on emerging market demand due to lower demand for emerging 
market products and vice versa. In addition, we assume that advanced 
economies’ central banks actively monitor global development. Thus, as 
emerging markets grow due to demand shock or supply shock, the central 
banks in advanced economies reduce the rate to support the economy or 
prevent deflation. Supply shock and falling prices in emerging economies 
creating deflationary pressure in advanced economies (Hirakata et al. 2014) 
A demand shock in advanced economies will increase output, price, rate, oil 
price and also output and price in emerging economies. 
 A supply shock in advanced economies will increase output and reduce 
prices and rates in advanced economies. This is the same as Peersman 
(2005) and Fry and Pagan (2011), however, the impact on emerging market 
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output is negative while the price is unrestricted. Furthermore, the impact 
on the oil price is negative following Kilian and Murphy (2014). 
 Policy rate shocks in advanced economies reduce output and prices. As the 
rate increases, the capital flow will reverse and the cost of foreign 
denominated debt will increase. The impact on output in emerging 
economies will be negative and will increase prices.  The impact on the price 
of oil is negative, consistent with the response of the price level (Peersman 
(2005)). 
 A demand shock in emerging markets increases output prices and the oil 
price. The impact on advanced economies’ supply and demand is 
unrestricted and on rates will be negative, consistent with the assumption 
described above.  
 An emerging market supply shock increases output in emerging economies 
and reduces prices. It has a negative impact on output in advanced 
economies and the price will be unrestricted. The impact on oil price is also 
negative.  
 An oil price shock could be due to disruptions to supply caused by natural 
disaster or changes in production quotas. Following Kilian and Murphy 
(2014), this leads to price increases and reduces output in both advanced 
and emerging economies. The central bank could react and increase the rate 
to reduce the price increases. 
As we can see from these assumptions the impact on all UK variables will be 
determined endogenously in the model and we restrict the foreign block. 
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3.6 Results 
 
3.6.1 International movement 
 
We extracted six factors from foreign blocks in which three are factors from 
advanced economies, two are factors from emerging economies, and one will be 
real oil prices. These factors are extracted by the principal component analysis and 
presented below. 
 
Figures 3-7 and 3-8 plot real economic activity and inflation in advanced 
economies. The grey bars are the recession in the US or recession in any two 
advanced economies. The pattern of real economic activity in advanced economies 
matched that reported in literature such as Kose et al. (2003), Bagliano and Claudio 
(2009) and Perri (2014). From the chart we can see the recession profiles in 1980, 
1990, 2000 and the most recent one in 2007-9. The latest recession has the deepest 
contraction, followed by the recession in the early 1980s. 
 
The profile of inflation factors in advanced economies is also matched to those 
reported in earlier literature such as Cicarelli and Mojon (2010). In the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, advanced economies were associated with high inflation but 
since the mid-1980s and especially since the early 1990s, inflation has been 
persistently positive, low and stable. This is in line with the common disinflation 
around the world that Rogoff (2003) reported. Furthermore, the commodity price 
shock is considered to be one of the main drivers for the global inflation dynamic, 
although this factor cannot be explained by the comovement alone (Gerard, 2012).  
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Figure 3-7: Real economic activity factors in advanced economies 
 
Figure 3-8: Inflation factors in advanced economies 
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Figure 3-9: Interest rate factors in advanced economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-10: Real economic activity factors in emerging economies 
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Figure 3-11: Inflation factors in emerging economies 
 
Figure 3-12: Real oil price factors 
 
The comovements in real activity and inflation for emerging economies are 
presented in Figures 3-10 and 3-11. The grey bars show an economic crisis in at 
least two of these countries. The dates for the economic crises come from 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011). The crisis could be a debt-crisis default, banking 
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crisis or currency crisis. As we can see from the chart, crises show a comovement 
among these countries and lead to a decline in economic activity. The real activity 
in emerging economies also has comovement with the advanced economies. For 
example recessions in the early 1980s, the 1990s, 2000 and 2007 in advanced 
economies also coincides with a decline in economic activity in emerging 
economies. 
The inflation profile in these countries is shown in Graph 9. From the mid-1980s to 
mid-1990s some of these emerging economies experienced very high inflation or 
even hyperinflation. Brazil had high inflation from 1986 to 1994, but from July 
1994 to 1997 inflation reduced to international levels as a result of reforms such as 
revaluing the currency, making it illegal for the central bank to finance government 
debt and freezing wages. Mexico also experienced high inflation following a default 
in the 1980s, the peso crisis and currency devolution in 1994. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union was followed by reforms in Russia in the early 1990s that also brought 
on high inflation. In Turkey inflation was attributed to the high public sector budget 
deficit and massive infrastructure investment, among other factors Aykut (2005).  
The oil price factor is in figure 3-12. The grey bars show geopolitical events in the 
oil exporting countries. These events in the oil market could be the Arab Oil 
Embargo, the Iran–Iraq war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Asian financial 
crisis when demand plummeted from these energy-hungry countries, the 9/11 
attack, and the global financial crisis in 2007-9.  
Overall, these international comovements in emerging and advanced economies are 
mostly attributed to common components. The potential drivers for these 
comovement points in the literature (see Canova et al. (2007), Crucini, Kose and 
Otrok (2011), Wen (2007)) are international trade, financial conditions, monetary 
policy, and movement in productivity and consumption demand. 
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3.6.2 Aggregate demand shock in advanced 
economies 
 
We consider the increase in aggregate demand by 1 per cent on average in advanced 
economies. This increase could be a result of fiscal expansion or increases in 
confidence which boost private consumption and investment. The governments in 
these economies boost demand through various stimuli. The impact of this demand 
will spill over to their trading partners such as the UK.  
The impulse response of the shock is presented in Figures 3-13 and 3-14. The shock 
is identified by sign restriction. The magnitude of the impact of the shock depends 
on the exposure of the economy under investigation to the country that originated 
the shock, as well as the different price and demand elasticities of trade: Orazgani 
and Fic (2013). As can be observed, the increases in aggregate demand in advanced 
economies will push inflation factors in the advanced economy, while the impact 
on the emerging market inflation factor is lower. However, the impact on the 
interest rate factor in advanced economies is prolonged while the impact on the oil 
price is quite short lived. 
The dynamic impact of this shock on the UK economy in Figure 3-13 demonstrates 
that prices, the GDP deflator and wages will increase in line with the advanced 
economies. The GDP deflator will grow by around 0.15 PP over three periods while 
the consumer price indices and wages will grow by around 0.2 PP over the same 
periods. This is consistent with the expansion in global demand that puts upward 
pressure on the price of manufacturing inputs and intermediate goods.  
The trade balance will improve as a result of depreciation in the nominal effective 
exchange rate. This improvement is in line with the recent study by the Bank of 
England: see Kamath and Varun (2011). As a result of depreciation in the effective 
exchange rate by around 25 per cent from mid-2007 to 2009, there were significant 
improvements in the current account balance.  
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Figure 3-13: Aggregate demand shock in advanced economies and the impact 
on UK variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
 
Figure 3-14: Aggregate demand shock in advanced economies and the impact 
on foreign variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
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For the first two quarters, as a result of strong demand from advanced economies, 
real output will rise. This, combined with a rise in prices, will create prolonged 
inflationary pressure. Consequently the UK central bank will contract monetary 
policy to combat inflationary pressure stemming from foreign demand. The impact 
is shown on the 10-year government bond yield. The government bond yields will 
increase by 0.4 per cent on average. This increase will have an adverse impact on 
the real economy in the medium to long term. Consequently, real output, 
consumption and investment will fall for the first 10 months before reverting.  
The impacts on financial instruments such as house and equity prices are pro-
cyclical, meaning moving with economic development. These variables respond 
immediately to shocks and rise with the initial jump in output. However, after the 
central bank raises interest rates, these variables will fall back. One explanation 
could be the result of a hike in interest rates and falling output due to economic 
adjustments. The cost of mortgages will be unaffordable and demand for houses 
will drop. In addition, people may switch from equity to bonds due to the rate 
increase.   
3.6.3 Aggregate demand shock in emerging 
economies 
 
The impacts of emerging economy demand shocks for the same variables are 
presented in Figures 3-15 and 3-16. The impulse responses of all variables in 
emerging economies are comparable to those in advanced economies. 
Notwithstanding, the magnitude is different compared to the advanced economies:  
most variable response is one third of that seen in advanced economies. Despite 
having different ties with the UK and economic structures, the similarity of the 
impact shows the sensitivity of the UK economy to international shock. In addition, 
this confirms the importance of emerging market shocks for the UK economy.  
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Figure 3-15: Aggregate demand shock in emerging economies and its impact 
on UK variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
 
Figure 3-16: Aggregate demand shock in emerging economies on foreign 
variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
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3.6.4 Oil price shock 
 
The impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy has been the subject of many 
studies. The magnitudes of the impact are dependent on the oil intensity of the 
economy, oil exporter status and the methodology of estimation (WB 2015); for 
example, a 10 per cent increase in oil price will reduce US real activity by 0.3-0.6 
per cent and that of the Euro Zone by 0.1-0.3 per cent (Jimenez-Rodriguez et al., 
2005). Additionally, the literature broadly confirms that the impact of the oil price 
on the economy has decreased since the mid-1980s — see, for example, Bernanke 
et al. (1997), Hooker (2002) and Hamilton (2009). This could be a result of the 
reduction in the oil intensity of these economies (appendix A shows the oil intensity 
of the countries studied). 
The literature in this area also suggests that the impact of oil price shocks on 
advanced economies depends on the underlying shocks: see Baumeister et al. 
(2010) and Peersman et al. (2012). These studies are mostly focused on the impact 
of oil price shocks on US or major oil exporting countries such as the OPEC 
members, and a few studies focus on the cross-country impacts.  
Nevertheless, the UK economy moved from being a traditional oil importer to an 
oil exporter in the early 1980s. Empirical studies suggest that a 10 per cent fall in 
oil price will reduce output by 0.8 to 2.5 per cent in oil exporting countries (WB, 
2012). Therefore the impact of the shock on the UK economy could vary due to its 
oil exporter status. The asymmetric impact of oil price also has been widely studied. 
If we assume that the impact on the oil price is symmetric, then a positive/negative 
price shock will increase/decrease government revenue, and it may help output or 
it may reduce real economic activity. 
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Figure 3-17: oil price shock and its impact on UK variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
 
 
Figure 3-18: oil price shock and its impact on foreign variables 
This figure shows the median response together with 68 per cent confidence band. The shock scale 
to unit of QE shock and 25000 simulation, with the first 20000 as burn in, were used to generate 
impulse response.  
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Figure 3-17 and 3-18 plots the impact of a 1 per cent increase in real oil prices on 
the advanced and emerging economies and selected variables in the UK. As we can 
see from the graph, when the oil price increases the real activity factor in advanced 
and emerging economies falls and prices increase. The magnitude of the impact on 
inflation for both advanced and emerging economies is the same while the impact 
on output in advanced economies is lower. This could reflect reduction in oil 
intensity of these economies and high dependency on oil in emerging economies.  
 
The effect of oil price shocks in the UK economy is in line with advanced and 
emerging economies at least for output and inflation. We see a reduction in output 
and a rise in prices. This may reflect that the UK was an oil exporter for the majority 
of the sample and it’s possible the UK was shielded from external oil shocks.  The 
price will increase in the UK as the oil price feeds into the consumer price deflator. 
It shows that impacts on wages and inflation are quite long lasting. As a result of 
the increase in price and wages, monetary policy reacts and the interest rate will 
increase. Mortgages become more expensive, reducing the demand for houses and 
thus house prices. 
 
3.6.5 International supply shock and 
distribution of domestic prices 
 
 
The literature has investigated how the sectorial prices respond to shocks. For 
example, Boivin et al. (2009) and Balke and Wynne (2007) investigate the impact 
of monetary policy shocks on prices while Mumtaz et al. (2009) look at the impact 
of supply shocks on price deflators. However, in this study, following Mumtaz et 
al. (2009), we look at the impact of supply shock from emerging economies, 
advanced economies and oil price shocks on the consumer price deflator and 
associate quantity. This will help us to quantify and distinguish the relative 
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importance of the supply shocks originating from advanced economies versus 
emerging economies, and to compare them to oil price shocks. Figures 3-18 and 3-
19 plot the outcome of these shocks on the consumer price deflator left panel and 
the associated quantity on the right panel. 
 
 
Figure 3-19: Impact of supply on disaggregated consumer price deflator 
(blue is median and the black line is the aggregate response) 
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Figure 3-20: Standard deviation at each point for the consumer price deflator 
and its quantity due to shock to an advanced economy, emerging economies 
and oil price shock. 
As we can see from the graph, a positive supply shock to both emerging markets 
and advanced economies reduces prices in the UK. However, the quantity response 
for the advanced economy shows an increase (a wide dispersion) while quantity is 
less responsive to emerging market supply shocks. This may confirm that a supply 
shock in advanced economies has more impact on UK price than for emerging 
economies. Furthermore, the panels in Figure 3-20 show the increases in standard 
deviation response at each forecast horizon point. This will confirm increases in 
dispersions of price and quality at each forecast horizon. This suggests that both 
supply shocks have a permanent impact on some components.  
In the final row we present the impact of the oil price shocks on the consumer price 
deflator. The increase in oil price shocks will lead to increases in prices and reduce 
the quantity. The standard deviation of response of oil price shocks for each forecast 
horizon also shows a major discrepancy between prices and quantity: some products 
may become permanently expensive. We also check if this is happening under 
falling oil prices, and the result suggests that oil price increases have a permanent 
impact. 
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3.6.6 Forecast error variance decomposition  
 
To evaluate the relative importance of each shock, we compute the forecast error 
decomposition. The median of this computation for selected variables in the UK 
is in Figure 3-21.  Overall the advanced economies shock has a substantial impact 
on the UK variables. The demand and supply shock in advanced economies 
contributes to most of the forecast error variance of these selected variables. For 
example, each of these two shocks explain 5 to 10 per cent of the forecast 
variance of these variables. Interestingly, we don’t see a huge contribution to 
forecast variance from an oil price shock. This could be due to reduction in oil 
intensity of production in the advanced economies and in particular in the UK. 
In addition to these shocks, we can see a large contribution from emerging 
market demand and supply shocks, notably on inflation and asset prices such as 
the FTSE and government bond yield. For example, we expected that interest 
rate shock in G7 could have explained more of the forecast error variance of asset 
prices such as nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and government bonds.  
However, the forecast variance of government bonds due to supply shocks in 
emerging economies and demand shock in advanced economies is significant 
compared to the interest rate. Also, it’s hard to justify the forecast variance of the 
nominal effective exchange rate due to demand from both emerging market and 
advanced economies being the same. Given our strong assumption for 
identification some of these results need further investigation. 
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Figure 3-21: Forecast error variance decomposition for selected UK variables  
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3.7 Sensitivity analysis 
 
We perform two sets of analysis to check our demand shock and oil price shock. 
First, we perform a subsample analysis and compare the full set of data. Then we 
compare the FAVAR result to a large scale model NiGEM. 
3.7.1 Subsample analysis 
 
To check the credibility of our results we perform a subsample analysis on data 
since 1997. Figures 3-21 and 3-22 present the outcome of the subsample (solid line) 
compared to the full sample (dotted line) for selected variables. The results are 
similar to the full sample periods but the adjustment process for prices is faster, 
around 2-4 quarters compared to nearly 3 years in full sample sizes.  
However, the impact of the shock for the real economy such as real output, 
consumption and investment arise nearly the same, with a slightly larger impact in 
initial periods. The quick adjustment in prices could be the outcome of low and 
stable inflation and monetary policy in these periods. The picture is the same for 
emerging markets. Overall, this exercise confirms the validity of the importance of 
the shock originating from these economies, and most importantly emerging 
economies.  
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Figure 3-22: advanced economies full sample (solid line) and subsample 
(dotted line) 
 
Figure 3-23: emerging economies full sample (solid line) and subsample 
(dotted line) 
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3.7.2 Model comparison  
 
To evaluate our results in FAVAR, we compare the demand shock from advanced 
and emerging economies and oil price shocks to the National Institute Global 
Macroeconomic Model (NiGEM).  
NiGEM is a large-scale quarterly macroeconomic model of the world economy. 
Most OECD countries are modelled separately, and the rest of the world is modelled 
through regional blocks. Economies are linked through trade, competitiveness and 
financial markets. All country models contain the determinants of domestic 
demand, export and import volumes, prices, current accounts and net assets. The 
comprehensive list of individual countries and regions for NiGEM version 2013 is 
presented in Table 3-1. 
    
  World  model  NiGEM 
Individual countries  model  
EU27 EU27   
Euro Area non EMU  
Individual 
countries  Region  
Austria Bulgaria Australia Africa 
Belgium 
Czech 
Republic Canada Asia Far East 
Estonia Denmark China  commonwealth and independent states  
Finland Hungary 
Hong 
Kong Developing Europe 
France Latvia India Latin America 
Germany Lithuania Japan Middle East  
Greece Poland  Mexico  
Ireland Romania New Zealand 
Italy Slovenia Norway  
Netherlands Sweden Russia  
Portugal UK  South Africa 
Slovak Republic South Korea 
Spain  Switzerland 
  Taiwan  
  US  
 
Table 3-1: The list of countries and regions for NiGEM version 2013 
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NiGEM is structured around the national income identity, can accommodate 
forward looking consumer behaviour and has many of the characteristics of a 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Unlike a pure DSGE 
model, NiGEM is based on estimation using historical data. The model is designed 
for policy analysis and forecasting. It uses quarterly data starting from 1961 and 
contains 6000 equations. Therefore, describing the model of each country and 
giving a detailed explanation is outside the scope of this overview. A reader seeking 
details of the model is encouraged to visit the National Institute web site and in 
particular Barrel et al. (2004a). 
As part of our exercise in FAVAR, we look at supply and demand shocks in 
advanced and emerging economies and oil price shocks and we compare the results 
to those in NiGEM. I review key equations in NiGEM and the way in which it 
interacts with the price system. Supply and demand is the core of the NiGEM 
model, as is shown in the figure below: 
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Figure 3-24: The schematic overview of the NiGEM model 
(Source:  NIESR)
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3.7.2 .1 Overview of the key equations 
 
The economic output in the short to medium run is driven by the demand side of 
the economy and the following national account identity holds (equation 1). 
However, the output in the long run is driven by underlying production function 
that constitutes the supply side of the economy (equation 3).   
  
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝑃𝑆𝐼 + 𝐺𝐶 + 𝐺𝐼 + 𝐷𝑆 + 𝑋𝑉𝑂𝐿 − 𝑀𝑉𝑂𝐿 + 𝑅𝐸𝑆   (3-4)                                                                                           
 
In this equation (3-4), (Y) is real output, (C) household consumption, (PSI) private 
sector investment and  (GC) government consumption, (GI) government 
investment, (DS) stock building, XVOL is exports and MVOL is imports, and 
finally RES is residual. For each component of demand, there is an estimated 
equation, for example for household consumption (C) modelled in the following 
error correction (ECM) form: 
 
ln(𝑐) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝑅𝑃𝐷𝐼) + (1 − 𝛽)ln (𝑅𝐹𝑁 + 𝑅𝑇𝑊)        (3-5)  
 
The consumption decision depends on real disposable income and wealth in the 
long run. The total wealth consists of the financial wealth and tangible wealth 
(housing wealth). In equation (3-5), C is real consumption, RPDI is real disposable 
income, RFN is real net financial assets and RTW is real tangible assets. The 
dynamics of adjustment in the long run are based on data and differ between 
countries to take account of the importance of different assets in each country, and 
also liquidity constraint.  
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In the long-run, output is tied down by an underlying production function that 
describes the supply-side of the economy in equation (3). In this each economy 
relies on a constant return to scale (CES) production function with labour 
augmenting technological progress. This is embedded within the Cobb-Douglas 
framework to allow the factor of production to interact with oil usage.  
 
  𝑌𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡 = 𝛾 ( )
𝛼
𝑂1−𝛼                      (3-6)                      
     
YCAP is real output, K is the total capital stock, L is total hours worked, O is oil 
input, t is time subscript, (𝜆)  is labour augmenting technological progress, ρ is the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour and α is the output elasticity of 
the non-oil sector of the economy. This production function shows the potential 
output and constitutes the theoretical background for the specifications of the factor 
demand equations. In this, the major force for long term equilibrium in the labour 
to output ratio is real wage and technical progress, while capital will be determined 
by the user cost of capital.   
In the short run, output is driven by demand. The gap between demand and potential 
output is measured as capacity utilisation as follows: 
  𝐶𝑈𝑡 =
𝑌𝑡
𝑌𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡
          (3-7) 
This will be fed into the price system, which gradually adjusts between actual and 
potential output. For example, if we introduce a shock to demand without changing 
the factor of production, the short run demand will be larger than actual demand. 
This will create inflationary pressure that will reduce total demand to equate the 
potential output to real output. 
The economy in the long run will be driven by the supply side as equation (3-6) 
shows. However in the short to medium run, demand will determine the output.  
 
    /1))(1(   tLesKs
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Prices 
Prices are the main factor that adjusts the gap between demand and supply in the 
long run. Consumer prices are modelled in the following forms.  
 
△ ln(𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡) = 𝛼 − 𝛽1 [
ln(𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑡−1)
1 +
1
2 𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑡−1
− 𝛽2 ln(𝑃𝑀𝑡−1) − (1 − 𝛽2) ln(𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑡−1)] + 𝛽3
△ ln(𝑃𝑀𝑡) + 𝛽4 △ ln (𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑡) 
(3-8) 
In this equation CED stands for the consumer price deflator, itr is indirect tax rate, 
PM is the price of imports and UTC is the unit total cost, while α and β are the 
parameters. In this the consumer price is a function of domestic inflation that is 
captured by UTC and also imported inflation PM. Furthermore, unit total cost 
depends on nominal wage growth, productivity and capacity utilisation. 
 
 
3.7.2.2 NiGEM results compared to FAVAR  
 
We increase the real economic activity in an advanced and emerging economy by 
1 per cent. We also shock the oil price by 1 per cent. The impacts of these shocks 
are reported in Figures 3-23, 3-24 and 3-25. In this exercise we are going to look at 
variables from the financial market, prices (supply side) and demand components. 
It is evident from these figures (3-23, 3-24, and 3-25) that the profile is the same: 
specifically, the direction of movement of the variables and magnitude is nearly the 
same as those we reported earlier.  
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3.7.2.3 Demand shocks in advanced and 
emerging economies 
  
Figures 3-25 and 3-26 show a comparison between FAVAR and NiGEM due to 
demand shock from advanced and emerging economies. The FAVAR result 
presented with a 68 per cent credible band is comparable to Figures 3-13 and 3-15. 
The top panel shows the asset price reaction, the middle the prices and the bottom 
of the panel the GDP and its components.  From comparison of the models in Figure 
3-24 we can conclude that the impact of demand in advanced economies on key UK 
variables under FAVAR and NiGEM is nearly the same in both direction and 
magnitude. Asset prices, the inflation measure and the output reaction is with the 
range. 
However, looking at figure 3-25, the emerging market shock slightly differs in 
terms of the reaction of some variables under NiGEM and FAVAR. For example, 
asset prices like the exchange rate have an initial spike under FAVAR, or the 
reaction of the long term government bond is stronger. Also response of the prices, 
output and its components is slightly higher in FAVAR compared to NiGEM 
reaction. However, we should note that the result is not significantly different under 
each model. 
The notable difference between these two models, FAVAR and NiGEM, is that the 
GDP reverts back to base, after which the price starts to increase in NiGEM, due to 
both shocks. Consumption adjustment in NiGEM takes a substantial amount of time 
— nearly 6 years — to revert while the economy in FAVAR models takes around 
3 years. We could say adjustments under FAVAR are faster than in NiGEM, but 
overall the reaction to these two demand shocks in FAVAR is comparable to 
NiGEM.   
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Figure 3-25: Impact of aggregate demand in advanced economies dashed line 
and NiGEM simulation increase of 1 per cent to output shock in one quarter 
In this we increase demand in advanced economies by 1 per cent in one quarter in NiGEM and in 
FAVAR we increase demand in advanced economies by 1 per cent.  Median percentile with 68 per 
cent band FAVAR and solid line with * NiGEM output simulation 
 
 Figure 3-26: Impact of aggregate demand in emerging economies dashed line 
and NiGEM simulation increase of 1 per cent to output shock in one quarter 
In this we increase demand in emerging markets by 1 per cent in one quarter in NiGEM and in 
FAVAR also we increase demand in emerging market by 1 per cent.  Median percentile with 68 per 
cent band FAVAR and solid line with * NiGEM output simulation. 
 
193 
 
3.7.2.4 Oil price shock  
 
Figure 3-27 shows the impact of the increases in the oil price by 1 per cent in both 
FAVAR and NiGEM over the same variables. The dotted line is the outcome from 
NiGEM while the line with the error band is the outcome from FAVAR. In both 
models as a result of an oil price shock price measures such as the consumer price 
deflator, wages and GDP deflator will increase with nearly the same magnitude. 
This leads to a fall in output, consumption and investment. Financial instruments 
such as the nominal effective exchange rate, pound sterling to US dollars and 10 
year government bond yield are rising. However, the profile for adjustments to the 
base is different. For example, the exchange rates in FAVAR are more transitory 
while the reaction of NEER in NiGEM is more prolonged.  The outcome in FAVAR 
is in line with a recent study by Buetzer et al. (2015) that suggests the link between 
oil price movement and exchange rate is loose. The outcome of the NEER in 
NiGEM is closer to the theory that links the exchange rate to terms of trade and the 
wealth effect. 
In theory the oil price shock could affect the exchange rate through terms of trade 
and the wealth effect. A positive term of trade shock for an oil exporter drives up 
the price of non-tradable goods in the domestic economy and the real exchange rate, 
that is defined as the relative price of traded to non-tradeable goods between 
domestic and foreign countries. As prices in the non-tradeable goods sector are 
sticky, the adjustment of the real exchange rate may require nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. In addition, it also transfers wealth from oil importers to oil exporters; 
this will shift the current account balance (Kilian, 2007). To restore the net external 
financial stability of oil exporters, the real exchange rate has to appreciate to restore 
the non-oil trade balance (Bodenstein et al., 2012, Sascha Bützer, Maurizio Habib, 
and Livio Stracca, 2015). 
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Figure 3-27: Comparing impact of oil price shock in FAVAR and NiGEM 
simulation 
In this we increase oil price by 1 per cent in one quarter in NiGEM and FAVAR also we increase 
oil price by 1 per cent.  Median percentile with 68 per cent band FAVAR and solid line with * 
NiGEM output simulation 
3.7.2.5 Best model choice 
 
We used three exercises that show that a simple and transparent model such as 
FAVAR can use substantial information from large scale models and produce very 
similar results. We also provide a 68 per cent credible band which shows that the 
NiGEM simulation is within the band. Given the simplicity of FAVAR and 
complexity and running cost of NiGEM, the result from these two models for these 
simulations are comparable. However, this may require a full model comparison in 
terms of policy simulation results and forecasting.  
Although this kind of exercise is beyond the scope of this study, we believe it is 
worthwhile.  
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3.8 Conclusion  
 
In this paper we employ a rich dataset of around 615 variables to study the impact 
of supply and demand shocks on the UK economy. Unlike previous studies, we 
separate shocks from emerging markets, advanced economies and oil prices. We 
use data on the G7 as representative for advanced economies and BRICS, Mexico 
and Turkey as representative of emerging economies. Foreign data covers real 
economy, prices and real oil prices and the UK economy data covers prices, activity, 
the external sector, government sector, financial sector and the labour market.  
An aggregate demand shock in advanced economies increases prices such as CPI, 
GDP deflator and wages. As a result, the Bank of England increases interest rates 
to combat inflation. It will take around 3 years to get inflation under control. The 
increase in rate and high inflation is a drag on the real economy. The real economy 
goes through painful adjustments which lead to a depreciation in the pound and the 
nominal effective exchange rate, and as a result the trade balance will improve. The 
financial sector also follows the real economy, and house prices and equity will fall 
in line with the real economy. Impacts of demand from emerging markets on the 
UK have the same kind of profile with a smaller magnitude. Furthermore, a supply 
shock from advanced and emerging economies reduces prices but a shock from 
advanced economies will make some products permanently less expensive. 
Moreover, an oil price shock reduces real economic activity in the UK and in 
advanced and emerging economies. Prices will increase in these economies, which 
is in line with the literature. The result that we obtain from FAVAR is in line with 
established multi country large scale models such as NiGEM. This chapter contributes 
to policy debates on Brexit as the United Kingdom negotiates its departure from the 
European Union. 
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Appendix A. Figure A: oil intensity of the countries under investigation; solid 
line is for advanced economies and dashed line is for emerging economies  
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Appendix B: data code, name and transformation, 1 for level, 5 for log difference 
and, 6 log second differences  
code  Name  Transformation 
USY U.S.A.: GDP, US$ Bn (AR), 2009 prices 5 
CNY Canada: GDP, CN$ Mn, 2007 prices 5 
JPY Japan: GDP, Yen Bn, 2005 prices 5 
FRY France: GDP, Euro Bn, 2005 prices 5 
ITY Italy: GDP, Bn Euro, 2005 prices 5 
GEY Germany: GDP, Euro Bn, 2005 prices 5 
USQ66..CE US INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
CNQ66..CE CN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
JPQ66..CE JP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
FRQ66..CE FR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
ITQ66..CE IT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
BDQ66..CE BD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
USOIO U.S.A.: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
GEOIO Germany: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
FROIO France: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
ITOIO Italy: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
CNOIO Canada: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
JPOIO Japan: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
USXVOL U.S.A.: Exports of goods and servs, US 5 
CNXVOL Canada: Exports of goods and servs, CN 5 
JPXVOL Japan: Exports of goods and servs, Ye 5 
FRXVOL France: Exports of goods and servs, Eu 5 
ITXVOL Italy: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
GEXVOL Germany: Exports of goods and servs,  E 5 
USMVOL U.S.A.: Imports of goods and servs, 20 5 
CNMVOL Canada: Imports of goods and servs, CN 5 
JPMVOL Japan: Imports of goods and servs, 20 5 
FRMVOL France: Imports of goods and servs, Eu 5 
ITMVOL Italy: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
GEMVOL Germany: Imports of goods and servs,  E 5 
USCED U.S.A.: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
CNCED Canada: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
JPCED Japan: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
FRCED France: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
ITCED Italy: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
GECED Germany: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
USPY U.S.A.: GDP deflator, 2009=100 5 
CNPY Canada: GDP deflator, 2007=100 5 
JPPY Japan: GDP deflator, 2005=100 5 
FRPY France: GDP deflator, 2005=100 5 
ITPY Italy: GDP deflator, 2005=100 5 
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GEPY Germany: GDP deflator, 2005=100 5 
USPM U.S.A.: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
CNPM Canada: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
JPPM Japan: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
FRPM France: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
ITPM Italy: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
GEPM Germany: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
USPMCOM U.S.A.: Import price of commodities, d 5 
CNPMCOM Canada: Import price of commodities, d 5 
JPPMCOM Japan: Import price of commodities, d 5 
FRPMCOM France: Import price of commodities, d 5 
ITPMCOM Italy: Import price of commodities, d 5 
GEPMCOM Germany: Import price of commodities, d 5 
USPMNCOM U.S.A.: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
CNPMNCOM Canada: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
JPPMNCOM Japan: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
FRPMNCOM France: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
ITPMNCOM Italy: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
GEPMNCOM Germany: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
USPXCOM U.S.A.: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
CNPXCOM Canada: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
JPPXCOM Japan: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
FRPXCOM France: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
ITPXCOM Italy: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
GEPXCOM Germany: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
USPXNCOM U.S.A.: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
CNPXNCOM Canada: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
JPPXNCOM Japan: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
FRPXNCOM France: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
ITPXNCOM Italy: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
GEPXNCOM Germany: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
USPMCOM U.S.A.: Import price of commodities, d 5 
CNPMCOM Canada: Import price of commodities, d 5 
JPPMCOM Japan: Import price of commodities, d 5 
FRPMCOM France: Import price of commodities, d 5 
ITPMCOM Italy: Import price of commodities, d 5 
GEPMCOM Germany: Import price of commodities, d 5 
USPMNCOM U.S.A.: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
CNPMNCOM Canada: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
JPPMNCOM Japan: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
FRPMNCOM France: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
ITPMNCOM Italy: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
GEPMNCOM Germany: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
USPX U.S.A.: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
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CNPX Canada: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
JPPX Japan: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
FRPX France: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
ITPX Italy: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
GEPX Germany: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
CNLR Canada: Long term interest rate 1 
CNR3M Canada: 3 month interest rates 1 
FRLR France: Long term interest rate 1 
FRR3M France: 3 month interest rates 1 
GELR Germany: Long term interest rate 1 
GER3M Germany: 3 month interest rates 1 
ITLR Italy: Long term interest rate 1 
ITR3M Italy: 3 month interest rates 1 
JPLR Japan: Long term interest rate 1 
JPR3M Japan: 3 month interest rates 1 
USLR U.S.A.: Long term interest rate 1 
USR3M U.S.A.: 3 month interest rates 1 
BRY Brazil: GDP, Bn reais, 1995 prices 5 
CHY China: GDP, Renminbi Bn, 2005 prices 6 
RUY 
Russian Federation: GDP, Rouble Bn, 2008 
prices 
5 
SAY South Africa: GDP, Bn ZAR, 2005 prices 5 
INY India: GDP, Bn INR, 2005 prices 5 
MXY Mexico: GDP, Pesos Bn, 2005 prices 5 
TUY Turkey: GDP, Mn lira, 2005 PPP 5 
BRQPRI35Q 
BR PRODUCTION - TOTAL INDUSTRY EXCL. 
CONSTRUCTION SADJ 
2 
CHXIPI..F CH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX NADJ 5 
SAQ66EYCE 
SA INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: 
MANUFACTURING VOLA 
5 
INQ66...F IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION NADJ 5 
MXQ66...F MX INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLN 5 
TKQ66..BH TK INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION VOLA 5 
BROIO Brazil: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
MXOIO Mexico: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
CHOIO China: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
INOIO India: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
SAOIO South Africa: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
TUOIO Turkey: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
RUOIO Russian Federation: Intensity of output (oil) 1 
BRXVOL Brazil: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
CHXVOL China: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
RUXVOL 
Russian Federation: Exports of goods and 
servs, Bn 
5 
SAXVOL South Africa: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
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INXVOL India: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
MXXVOL Mexico: Exports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
TUXVOL Turkey: Exports of goods and servs, Mn 5 
BRMVOL Brazil: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
CHMVOL China: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
RUMVOL 
Russian Federation: Imports of goods and 
servs, Bn 
5 
SAMVOL South Africa: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
INMVOL India: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
MXMVOL Mexico: Imports of goods and servs, Bn 5 
TUMVOL Turkey: Imports of goods and servs, Mn 5 
BRCED Brazil: Consumer expenditure deflator, 6 
CHCED China: Consumer expenditure deflator, 6 
RUCED 
Russian Federation: Consumer expenditure 
delfator, 
6 
SACED 
South Africa: Consumer expenditure 
deflator, 
6 
INCED India: Consumer expenditure deflator, 6 
MXCED Mexico: Consumer expenditure deflator, 6 
TUCED Turkey: Consumer expenditure deflator, 6 
BRPY Brazil: GDP deflator, 1995=100 6 
CHPY China: GDP deflator, 2005=100 6 
RUPY 
Russian Federation: GDP deflator, 2008 = 
100 
6 
SAPY South Africa: GDP deflator, 2005=100 6 
INPY India: GDP deflator, 2005=100 6 
MXPY Mexico: GDP deflator, 2005=100 6 
TUPY Turkey: GDP deflator, 2005=100 6 
BRPM Brazil: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
CHPM China: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
RUPM 
Russian Federation: Deflator, imports of 
goods and 
5 
SAPM South Africa: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
INPM India: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
MXPM Mexico: Deflator, imports of goods and 5 
TUPM Turkey: Deflator, imports of goods and 6 
BRPMCOM Brazil: Import price of commodities, d 5 
CHPMCOM China: Import price of commodities, d 5 
RUPMCOM 
Russian Federation: Import price of 
commodities, d 
5 
SAPMCOM South Africa: Import price of commodities, d 5 
INPMCOM India: Import price of commodities, d 5 
MXPMCOM Mexico: Import price of commodities, d 5 
TUPMCOM Turkey: Import price of commodities, d 5 
BRPMNCOM Brazil: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
CHPMNCOM China: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
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RUPMNCOM 
Russian Federation: Import price of non-
commoditie 
5 
SAPMNCOM 
South Africa: Import price of non-
commoditie 
5 
INPMNCOM India: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
MXPMNCOM Mexico: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
TUPMNCOM Turkey: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
BRPXCOM Brazil: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
CHPXCOM China: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
RUPXCOM 
Russian Federation: Price of commodity 
exports, US 
5 
SAPXCOM South Africa: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
INPXCOM India: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
MXPXCOM Mexico: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
TUPXCOM Turkey: Price of commodity exports, US 5 
BRPXNCOM Brazil: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
CHPXNCOM China: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
RUPXNCOM 
Russian Federation: Price of non-commodity 
exports 
5 
SAPXNCOM 
South Africa: Price of non-commodity 
exports 
5 
INPXNCOM India: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
MXPXNCOM Mexico: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
TUPXNCOM Turkey: Price of non-commodity exports 5 
BRPMCOM Brazil: Import price of commodities, d 5 
CHPMCOM China: Import price of commodities, d 5 
RUPMCOM 
Russian Federation: Import price of 
commodities, d 
5 
SAPMCOM South Africa: Import price of commodities, d 5 
INPMCOM India: Import price of commodities, d 5 
MXPMCOM Mexico: Import price of commodities, d 5 
TUPMCOM Turkey: Import price of commodities, d 5 
BRPMNCOM Brazil: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
CHPMNCOM China: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
RUPMNCOM 
Russian Federation: Import price of non-
commoditie 
5 
SAPMNCOM 
South Africa: Import price of non-
commoditie 
5 
INPMNCOM India: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
MXPMNCOM Mexico: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
TUPMNCOM Turkey: Import price of non-commoditie 5 
BRPX Brazil: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
CHPX China: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
RUPX 
Russian Federation: Deflator, exports of 
goods and 
5 
SAPX South Africa: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
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INPX India: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
MXPX Mexico: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
TUPX Turkey: Deflator, exports of goods and 5 
WDPOAA CRUDE OIL Brent 5 
WDPOBA CRUDE OIL UAE 5 
UKGC U.K.: Gov. consumption, GBP Mn, 2011 5 
UKINV U.K.: Investment (total), GBP Mn, 20 5 
UKIB U.K.: Investment (business), GBP Mn, 5 
UKGI U.K.: Investment (gov.), GBP Mn, 201 5 
UKMVOLM U.K.: Imports (goods and services), 5 
UKXVOLM U.K.: Exports (goods and services), 5 
UKXGIM U.K.: Exports  (goods), GBP Mn, 2011 5 
UKMGIM U.K.: Imports of goods, GBP Mn, 2011 5 
UKQEXSER U.K.: Exports (services), GBP Mn, 20 5 
UKQMSER U.K.: Imports (services), GBP Mn, 20 5 
BOPL 
BOP:EX:SA:Food, beverages and tobacco: 
SITC 0+1 £M 
5 
BOPM BOP:EX:SA:Basic materials: SITC 2+4 £M 5 
BOPO BOP:EX:SA:Semi-manufactures: SITC 5+6 £M 5 
BOPP 
BOP:EX:SA:Finished manufactures: SITC 7+8 
£M 
5 
BOQI 
BOP:EX:SA:Fuels other than oil: SITC 
32+34+35 £M 
5 
BOQL BOP:EX:SA:Unspecified goods: SITC 9 £M 5 
BPBI 
BOP:IM:SA:Fuels other than oil: SITC 
32+34+35 £M 
5 
BQAR 
BOP:IM:SA:Food, beverages and tobacco: 
SITC 0+1 £M 
5 
BQAS BOP:IM:SA:Basic materials: SITC 2+4 £M 5 
BQAU BOP:IM:SA:Semi-manufactures: SITC 5+6 £M 5 
BQAV 
BOP:IM:SA:Finished manufactures: SITC 7+8 
£M 
5 
BQAW BOP:IM:SA:Unspecified goods: SITC 9 £M 5 
ELBL BOP:EX:SA:Oil: SITC 33 £M 5 
ENXO BOP:IM:SA:Oil: SITC 33 £M 5 
UKWTRAD U.K.: World trade (UK perspective) 5 
UKTTRAD U.K.: Terms of trade 5 
UKGVAH U.K.: Whole economy GVA per hour 5 
UKSRATE U.K.: Saving ratio 1 
UKTW U.K.: UK Total Wealth 5 
UKPOPT U.K.: Population (total) , thousands 6 
UKCPROS U.K.: Corporation profit share 5 
UKKP U.K.: Capital stock  (private sector 5 
UKKG U.K.: Capital stock (gov.), GBP Mn, 5 
UKIPDC U.K.: Credit (interest, profit, divi 5 
UKIPDD U.K.: Debit (interest, profit, divid 5 
203 
 
UKCOMP U.K.: Total compensation, GBP Mn 5 
UKPSBY U.K.: Public Sector Net Borrowing (% 1 
UKCTO U.K.: Corporation tax receipts, oil 5 
UKNPRNO U.K.: Net profit, non-oil sector, GB 5 
UKNPRO U.K.: Net profit, oil sector, GBP Mn 2 
UKTAX U.K.: Direct tax receipts (household 5 
UKITAX U.K.: Taxes on expenditure 5 
UKTCURR U.K.: Total current receipts of the 5 
UKGIP U.K.: Gov. interest payments, GBP Mn 5 
UKSUBS U.K.: General gov. subsidies 5 
UKTCURE U.K.: Total current expenditure, pub 5 
UKRPDI U.K.: Real personal disposable incom 5 
UKCLU U.K.: ILO unemployment, thousands 5 
UKPI U.K.: Personal income, GBP Mn 5 
UKEE U.K.: Employees (in employment), tho 5 
UKE U.K.: Employees (total), thousands 5 
UKLF U.K.: Labour force, civilian, thousa 5 
UKPOPWA U.K.: Population (working age), thou 5 
UKHOURS U.K.: Hours worked per employee per 5 
UKY U.K.: Gross Domestic Product, GBP Mn 5 
GDQB ESA95 Output Index: F: Construction: 5 
CKYY 
IOP: Industry D: Manufacturing: CVMSA 
NAYear 
5 
GDQH 
SA95 Output Index: I : Transport storage & 
communication 
5 
GDQS SA95 Output Index: G-Q: Total 5 
GDQE 
ESA95 Output Index: G & H: Distribution, 
hotels & catering; repairs 
5 
CKYW IOP: Industry C,D,E: All production industries 5 
CKYZ 
IOP: Industry E: Electricity, gas and water 
supply: 
5 
CKZA 
IOP: Industry DA: Manuf of food, drink & 
tobacco 
5 
CKZF 
IOP: Industry DF: Manuf coke/petroleum 
prod/nuclear fuels 
5 
CKZG 
IOP: Industry DG: Manuf of chemicals & 
man-made fibres 
5 
UKC U.K.: Private consumption, GBP Mn, 2 5 
UTID Total 5 
LLKX All furnishing & household 5 
ATQX Furniture and households 5 
ATRD Carpets and other floor coverings 5 
XYJP Major household appliances 5 
XYJR Major tools and equipment 5 
LLKY All Health 5 
UWIC Therapeutic appliances and equipment 5 
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LLKZ All Transport 5 
TMMI All Purchase of vehicles 5 
TMML Motor Cars 5 
TMMZ Motor cycles 5 
TMNO Bicycles 5 
LLLA All Communication 5 
ATRR Telephone and telefax equipment 5 
LLLB All recreation and culture 5 
ATRV Audio visual equipment 5 
ATRZ 
Photo and cinema equip and optical 
instruments 
5 
ATSD Information processing equipment 5 
TMNB Major durables for outdoor recreation 5 
XYJT 
Musical instruments and major durables for 
indoor reacreation 
5 
LLLC All miscellaneous 5 
ZAYM Jewellery, clocks and watches 5 
UTIT Total 5 
LLLZ All clothing and footwear 5 
XYJN Clothing materials 5 
ZAVK Garments 5 
XYJO 
Other articles of clothing and clothing 
accessories 
5 
ATQV Shoes and other footwear 5 
LLMA All furnishings and household goods 5 
ATRF Household textiles 5 
XYJQ Small electric household appliances 5 
ATRJ 
Glassware, tableware and household 
utensils 
5 
XYJS Small tools and miscellaneous accessories 5 
LLMB All transport 5 
AWUW Motor vehicle spares 5 
LLMC All recreation and culture 5 
ATSH Recording media 5 
ATSL Games, toys and hobbies 5 
XYJU Equipment for sport, camping etc 5 
CDZQ Books 5 
LLMD All miscellaneous 5 
XYJX Electrical appliances for personal care 5 
ATSX Other personal effects 5 
UTIL Total 5 
ZWUN All food and non-alcoholic beverages 5 
UWBK All food 5 
UWBL Bread and cereals 5 
CCTK Meat 5 
205 
 
CCTL Fish 5 
CCTM Milk, cheese and eggs 5 
CCTN Oils and fats 5 
CCTO Fruit 5 
UWFD Vegetables 5 
UWFX Sugar and sweet products 5 
UWGH Food products n.e.c. 5 
UWGI All non-alcoholic beverages 5 
CCTT Coffee, tea and cocoa 5 
CCTU Mineral, water and soft drinks 5 
ZAKY All alcoholic beverages and tobacco 5 
UUIS Spirits 5 
UTHW Wine, cider and perry 5 
UUVG Beer 5 
ZWUP Tobacco 5 
LLLL 
All Housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels 
5 
ATUA 
Materials for the maintenance and repair of 
the dwelling 
5 
UTZN Water supply 5 
ZWUR All electricity, gas and other fuels 5 
CCUA Electricity 5 
LTZA Gas 5 
LTZC Liquid fuels 5 
TTAB Solid fuels 5 
LLLM All furnishing and household goods 5 
UWHO Non-durable household goods 5 
LLLN All health 5 
UTXP Pharmaceutical products 5 
UWIB Other medical products 5 
LLLO All transport 5 
CCTY Vehicle fuels and lubricants 5 
LLLP All recreation and culture 5 
AWUX Gardens, plants and flowers 5 
UWKQ Pets and related products 5 
CDZY Newspapers and periodicals 5 
XYJV Miscellaneous printed matter 5 
XYJW Stationery and drawing materials 5 
LLLQ All miscellaneous 5 
ATSP Other products for personal care 5 
UTIP Total 5 
LLLR All clothing and footwear 5 
UWHI Clothing, repair and hire of clothing 5 
AWUY Repair and hire of footwear 5 
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LLLS 
All housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels 
5 
ZAVQ All actual rentals for housing 5 
GBFG Actual rentals paid by tenants 5 
GBFK All imputed rentals for housing 5 
CCUO Imputed rentals of owner-occupiers 5 
GBFN Other imputed rentals 5 
AWUZ 
Services for the maintenance and repair of 
the dwelling 
5 
UTZX Sewerage collection 5 
LLLT All furnishings and household services 5 
UWHM 
Repair of furniture, furnishings and floor 
coverings 
5 
UWHN Repair of household appliances 5 
UWIA Domestic and household services 5 
LLLU All health 5 
ZAWG All out-patient services 5 
ZAWI Medical services 5 
ZAWK Dental services 5 
UTMH Paramedical services 5 
UTYF Hospital services 5 
LLLV Total transport 5 
AWVA Vehicle maintenance and repair 5 
ZAWQ Other vehicle services 5 
ZAWS All transport services 5 
AWVB Railways 5 
ZAWU Road 5 
AWVC Air 5 
AWVD Sea and inland waterway 5 
AWVE Other 5 
LLLW All communication 5 
CCVM Postal services 5 
ZAWY Telephone and telefax services 5 
LLLX All recreation and culture 5 
UWKO 
Repair of audio-visual, photographic and 
information processing equipment 
5 
UWKP 
Maintenance and repair of other major 
durables for recreation and culture 
5 
UWLD Veterinary and other services for pets 5 
ZAXI All recreational and cultural services 5 
ZAXK Recreational and sporting services 5 
ZAXM Cultural services 5 
CCVA Games of chance 5 
ZWUT Education 5 
ZAXS All restaurants and hotels 5 
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ZAXU All catering services 5 
ZAXW Restaurants, cafes etc. 5 
ZAYC Canteens 5 
ZAYE Accommodation services 5 
LLLY All miscellaneous 5 
CCVZ 
Hairdressing salons and personal grooming 
establishments 
5 
ZAYO Social protection 5 
ZAYQ All insurance 5 
UTYH Life insurance 5 
ZAYU Insurance connected with health 5 
ZAYW Insurance connected with transport 5 
ZAZA All financial services n.e.c. 5 
ZAZC All financial services other than FISIM 5 
ZAZE Other services n.e.c. 5 
TR trade balance 2 
FRAH RPI Total Food 5 
FRAI RPI Total Non-Food 5 
FRAK RPI Total All items other than seasonal Food 5 
UKULC U.K.: Unit labour costs 5 
UKP U.K.: Wholesale prices, 2011=100 5 
UKCED U.K.: Consumer expenditure deflator, 5 
UKPY U.K.: Deflator (GDP), 2011=100 5 
ROYJ Wages 5 
CP CPI 5 
UTKT Total 5 
LLOS All furnishing & household 5 
AWQK Furniture and households 5 
AWQL Carpets and other floor coverings 5 
AWQN Major household appliances 5 
AWQQ Major tools and equipment 5 
LLOT All Health 5 
AWQW Therapeutic appliances and equipment 5 
LLOU All Transport 5 
UTPP All Purchase of vehicles 5 
AWRA Motor Cars 5 
AWRB Motor cycles 5 
AWRC Bicycles 5 
LLOV All Communication 5 
UTPT Telephone and telefax equipment 5 
LLOW All recreation and culture 5 
AWRM Audio visual equipment 5 
AWRN 
Photo and cinema equip and optical 
instruments 
5 
AWRO Information processing equipment 5 
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AWRR Major durables for outdoor recreation 5 
AWRS 
Musical instruments and major durables for 
indoor recreation 
5 
LLOX All miscellaneous 5 
AWSL Jewelry, clocks and watches 5 
UTLB Total 5 
LLPU All clothing and footwear 5 
AWPP Clothing materials 5 
AWPQ Garments 5 
AWPR 
Other articles of clothing and clothing 
accessories 
5 
AWPT Shoes and other footwear 5 
LLPV All furnishings and household goods 5 
UTPH Household textiles 5 
AWQO Small electric household appliances 5 
UTPJ 
Glassware, tableware and household 
utensils 
5 
AWQR Small tools and miscellaneous accessories 5 
LLPW All transport 5 
AWRD Motor vehicle spares 5 
LLPX All recreation and culture 5 
AWRP Recording media 5 
AWRU Games, toys and hobbies 5 
AWRV Equipment for sport, camping etc 5 
AWSC Books 5 
LLPY All miscellaneous 5 
AWSJ Electrical appliances for personal care 5 
AWSM Other personal effects 5 
UTKX Total 5 
UTJO All food and non-alcoholic beverages 5 
UTOV All food 5 
AWPB Bread and cereals 5 
AWPC Meat 5 
AWPD Fish 5 
AWPE Milk, cheese and eggs 5 
AWPF Oils and fats 5 
AWPG Fruit 5 
AWPH Vegetables 5 
AWPI Sugar and sweet products 5 
AWPJ Food products n.e.c. 5 
UTOW All non-alcoholic beverages 5 
AWPK Coffee, tea and cocoa 5 
AWPL Mineral, water and soft drinks 5 
UTJP All alcolholic beverages and tobacco 5 
AWPM Spirits 5 
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AWPN Wine, cider and perry 5 
AWPO Beer 5 
UTOY Tobacco 5 
LLPG 
All Housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels 
5 
AWPZ 
Materials for the maintenance and repair of 
the dwelling 
5 
AWQB Water supply 5 
UTPF All electricity, gas and other fuels 5 
AWQF Electricity 5 
AWQG Gas 5 
AWQH Liquid fuels 5 
AWQI Solid fuels 5 
LLPH All furnishing and household goods 5 
AWQS Non-durable household goods 5 
LLPI All health 5 
AWQU Pharmaceutical products 5 
AWQV Other medical products 5 
LLPJ All transport 5 
AWRE Vehicle fuels and lubricants 5 
LLPK All recreation and culture 5 
AWRW Gardens, plants and flowers 5 
AWRX Pets and related products 5 
AWSD Newspapers and periodicals 5 
AWSJ Stationery and drawing materials 5 
LLPL All miscellaneous 5 
AWSK Other products for personal care 5 
UTKZ Total 5 
LLPM All clothing and footwear 5 
AWPS Clothing, repair and hire of clothing 5 
AWPU Repair and hire of footwear 5 
LLPN 
All housing, water, electricity, gas and other 
fuels 
5 
AWPV All actual rentals for housing 5 
AWPV Actual rentals paid by tenants 5 
UTPC All imputed rentals for housing 5 
AWPX Imputed rentals of owner-occupiers 5 
AWPY Other imputed rentals 5 
AWQA 
Services for the maintenance and repair of 
the dwelling 
5 
AWQD Sewerage collection 5 
LLPO All furnishings and household services 5 
AWQM 
Repair of furniture, furnishings and floor 
coverings 
5 
AWQP Repair of household appliances 5 
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AWQT Domestic and household services 5 
LLPP All health 5 
UTPN All out-patient services 5 
AWQX Medical services 5 
AWQY Dental services 5 
AWQZ Paramedical services 5 
UTPO Hospital services 5 
LLPQ Total transport 5 
AWRF Vehicle maintenance and repair 5 
AWRG Other vehicle services 5 
UTPR All transport services 5 
AWRH Railways 5 
AWRI Road 5 
AWRJ Air 5 
AWRK Sea and inland waterway 5 
AWRL Other 5 
LLPR All communication 5 
UTPS Postal services 5 
UTPU Telephone and telefax services 5 
LLPS All recreation and culture 5 
AWRQ 
Repair of audio-visual, photographic and 
information processing equipment 
5 
AWRY Veterinary and other services for pets 5 
UTPY All recreational and cultural services 5 
AWRZ Recreational and sporting services 5 
AWSA Cultural services 5 
AWSB Games of chance 5 
UTJX Education 5 
UTJY All restaurants and hotels 5 
UTQG All catering servies 5 
AWSG Restaurants, cafes etc. 5 
AWSH Canteens 5 
UTQH Accomodation services 5 
LLPT All miscellaneous 5 
AWSI 
Hairdressing salons and personal grooming 
establishments 
5 
UTQK Social protection 5 
UTQL All insurance 5 
AWSN Life insurance 5 
AWSO Insurance connected with the dwelling 5 
AWSP Insurance connected with health 5 
AWSQ Insurance connected with transport 5 
UTQM All financial services n.e.c. 5 
AWSS All financial services other than FISIM 5 
UTQN Other services n.e.c. 5 
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UKIDFL U.K.: Imports deflator 5 
UKXDFL U.K.: Deflator (exports) 5 
M4SA m4 5 
M4ISA M4 5 
M4OSA m4 5 
M4PSA m4 5 
M4LISA M4lending 5 
M4LOSA m4lending 5 
M4LPSA m4lending 5 
UKARR U.K.: Rate of household mortgage arr 1 
UKCC U.K.: Consumer credit held by househ 5 
UKCORPL U.K.: Non-financial corporate debt, 5 
UKMFIL U.K.: Bank lending to non-financial 5 
UKMORTH U.K.: Mortgage debt of households, G 5 
HP Real Nationwide house prices 5 
FTSE FTSE ALL Share Index 5 
EX1 pounds/dollar 5 
EX2 pounds/euro 5 
EX3 pounds/yen 5 
EX4 NEER 5 
EX5 pound/canada dollar 5 
EX6 pound\australia 5 
UKIPREM U.K.: Investment premium 1 
UKLENDW U.K.: Rate Spread - household (borro 1 
UKPREM U.K.: Equity price risk premium 1 
Bond1  1 
Bond2  1 
Bond3  1 
Bond4  1 
Bond5  1 
Bond6  1 
Bond7  1 
Bond8  1 
Bond9  1 
Bond10  1 
Bond11  1 
Bond12  1 
Bond13  1 
Bond14  1 
Bond15  1 
Bond16  1 
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